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The literature reviewed provides strong evidence that
individually metering resident utilities provides an estimated 10 -
35 percent utility reductions simply by providing a financial
incentive for tenants to conserve utilities. The two key aspects
of individual metering are, the financial incentives for tenants to
conserve utilities and the ability to hold tenants responsible for
consumed utilities through accurate utility meter readings.
The five alternatives for the conservation of utilities in
military housing proposed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Housing) are reevaluated in this thesis.
When evaluated from the tenants 1 perspective, the cost
effectiveness prioritization of the five proposed DoD alternatives
is reversed. DoD chose building and eguipment improvement as the
most cost effective way to conserve utilities but this alternative
is only a half measure which ignores economic incentives for the






C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 4




E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 8
1. Literature Review 8
2. Methodology 9
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 10
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 10
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 12
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 13
1. Government Literature 13
2. Civilian Literature 15
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 17
III. BACKGROUND 18
A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12003 18
B. PUBLIC LAW 95-82 (1977) 20
C. FAMILY HOUSING POLICY 2 5
IV. METHODOLOGY 2 6
A. DESIGN 26
B. DEMOGRAPHICS OF LA MESA VILLAGE 27
C. SOURCES OF DATA 3
1. Public Works Department 30
2. Naval Energy and Environmental Support
Activity 30
3. La Mesa Village Housing Office 30
D. QUESTIONS 30
V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 3 2
A. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 3 2
1. Individual versus Master Metering 32
a. Metering 32
b. Billing 36
2. Navy Opposition to Individual Metering . . 38
a. Installation 38
b. Personnel Loss 41
c. Monthly Meter Readings 41
(1) Personnel Cost 41
(2) Norm Calculations 42
(3) Billing 44
d. Service Calls 44
VI
B. ALTERNATIVE I: METER / BILLING OF EXCESS
CONSUMPTION 4 5
1. Description 45
2. Economic Analysis 45




b. Effect on Tenants 49
4. Pros and Cons 50
a. Pros 50
b. Cons 50
C. ALTERNATIVE II: METER WITH FULL PAYMENT .... 52
1. Description 52





b. Effect on Tenants 57
4. Pros and Cons 58
a. Pros 58
b. Cons 60
D. ALTERNATIVE III: METER WITH FEEDBACK ONLY ... 61
1. Description 61





4. Pros and Cons 67
a. Pros 67
b. Cons 67
E. ALTERNATIVE IV: BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT
IMPROVEMENT 68
1. Description 68
2. Economic Analysis 69
a. Theory 69
3. Pros and Cons 73
a. Pros 73
b. Cons 74
F. ALTERNATIVE V: METER, BILL FOR EXCESS
CONSUMPTION, WITH REWARD FOR CONSERVATION ... 75
1. Description 75
2. Economic Analysis 75
a. Theory 7 5
b. Example 7 7
3. Implementation 80
a. Billing 80
b. Effect on Tenants 80











VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recommendation Number 1
2. Recommendation Number 2




LA MESA VILLAGE 87
CIVILIAN LITERATURE BACKGROUND . . 8 9
UTILITY NORM CALCULATION FOR LA MESA VILLAGE 9 2
EXAMPLE MONTHLY UTILITY BILL 9 5
GLOSSARY 103
LIST OF REFERENCES 105
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 108










Since 1974, residential electricity consumption in the
United States has increased 162 percent, from 554,960,000,000
kilowatt-hours in 1974 to 899,573,000,000 kilowatt-hours in
1989 [Ref. l:pg a24]. There is no indication that this rate
of energy consumption will diminish in the future. The Navy's
recent interest in energy costs was largely stimulated by the
sevenfold increase in energy costs which began in 1973-74 with
the OPEC oil embargo [Ref. 2: pg 661].
The Navy has always been concerned about having enough
fuel to sustain its military operations. However, the Navy
has great difficulty in identifying energy efficient and
energy inefficient devices since the Navy relies on master
metering of utilities on its bases and in its family housing
areas. In an attempt to hold down energy consumption in one
area of the military budget, Congress passed Public Law 95-82
(1977) . This law directed the installation of energy
consumption metering devices on military family housing
facilities in every state, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Guam. In addition the
Secretary of Defense was directed to:
• Establish a reasonable ceiling for the consumption of
energy in any military family housing facility equipped
with an appropriate consumption metering device;
• Assess the member of the Armed Forces who is the occupant
of such facility a charge, at rates to be determined by
the Secretary of Defense, for any energy consumption
metered at such facility in excess of the ceiling
established for such facility pursuant to paragraph 1.
Such charges for excess energy consumption were not to be
made to any military tenant until:
• The Secretary of Defense conducts a test program to
determine the feasibility of assessing occupants of
military housing charges for excess energy consumption;
• The Secretary of Defense provides the written results of
such a test program, together with proposed regulations
implementing this section, to the Committees on Armed
Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives
;
• A period of 90 days expires following the date on which
the results referred to in clause 2 have been submitted to
such committees. [Ref. 3: pg 1-2,3]
Congress appropriated $8,500,000 (P.L. 95-101 (1977)) to
determine the feasibility of metering all family housing
facilities in DoD as stipulated by the guidelines set forth in
Appropriations Committees Conference Report H.R. No. 95-650 (3
Aug 1977) .
DoD conducted the feasibility study by metering 10,379 out
of DoD s approximately 300,000 housing units. The feasibility
study was coordinated by the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) . The report
to Congress on the feasibility of installing meters in all
family housing units estimated it would cost:
• $415,000,000 to meter all 300,000 remaining units,
• $ 50,000,000 to purchase minicomputers and software to
perform the norm calculations and produce
bills,
• $ 32,000,000 annual cost to read and maintain all
meters,
• $ 23,000,000 occupant education and increased occupant
generated maintenance service calls,
• $118,000,000 replacement cost due to negative retention
and morale aspects of metering
The costs of installing and maintaining meters were
compared to the estimated 6 percent energy consumption
reduction. This reduction would annually save 4,860,000 MBtu
or $32,000,000 in 1987 dollars.
In light of the prohibitive costs of installing meters in
all housing units, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Housing) proposed four alternatives:
• Alternative I - Meter and Billing of Excess
Consumption
No Reward for Good Conservation
Net Annual Cost of $42,320,000
• Alternative II - Meter with Full Payment
Net Annual Cost of $11,657,000
• Alternative III - Meter and Provide Feedback
Option A - Metering Individual Units
Net annual cost of $23,000,000
Option B - Master Meter
Net annual cost of $15,062,000
• Alternative IV - Building and Equipment Improvement
Net Annual Savings of $35,527,000
• Alternative V - Meter and Billing of Excess
Consumption
Reward for Good Conservation
Net Annual Cost of $11,571,000
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the five
alternatives previously mentioned. The analysis will
determine which alternative provides tenants with the greatest
incentive to conserve utilities. The five alternatives in the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Housing) report are analyzed from the perspective of a
landlord. This thesis will analyze the five alternatives from
the tenant's perspective.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is to establish which of the
five utility conservation alternatives provides the greatest
conservation incentive to tenants of military family housing.
The five alternatives include:
• Alternative I - Meter and billing of excess
consumption with no reward for
good conservation
• Alternative II - Meter with full payment
• Alternative III - Meter and provide feedback
• Alternative IV - Building and equipment improvement
• Alternative V - Meter and billing of excess
consumption with a reward for
good conservation
Secondary research guestions needed to support the primary
research guestion include:
• What are current Navy practices toward utility
conservation?
• How effective have conservation efforts been in Navy
housing at La Mesa Village, Monterey, California?
• What are the conservation conseguences of master metered
housing units?
• How successful are utility conservation practices in
master metered residential housing units?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This thesis will focus on the tenant's perspective on
the five utility conservation alternatives proposed in the
Congressional report by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Housing)
.
Public Law 95-82 (1977) and the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) report
references to "utilities" are synonymous with "energy" such as
electricity, oil and gas. This thesis will expand the
definition of "utilities" to include electricity, oil, gas and
water, since all four of these resources make up the Navy's
monthly utility billing.
The increased cost of all utilities and the
diminishing quantity of potable water in the Western United
States makes water conservation a logical extension of the
term "utilities".
2. Limitations
Current Navy utility conservation practices will be
restricted to the Navy military housing complex at La Mesa
Village in Monterey, California as a typical application of
Navy conservation practices and policies. Due to the
difficulty in obtaining extensive historical utility
consumption data from both the Navy and the utility companies,
historical utility consumption data is primarily restricted to
1989-92.
The thesis is directed toward establishing which Navy
wide policy would provide the greatest incentive for military
housing tenants to conserve utilities. Consequently, this
thesis will argue the pros and cons of master and individual
metering but not discuss the overall cost of either master or
individual metering.
Advances in meter reading technology will not be
considered in this thesis. The impact of remote meter
reading, inaccessible meters and time-of-use metering will not
be considered. This thesis will restrict meter reading
technology to its simplistic form of standard meters that can
be read by a meter reader on a monthly basis to determine
tenant utility consumption.
The pros and cons was well as the engineering and
economic implications of various utility conservation measures
(insulation, solar hot water heating, flow restrictors in
shower heads, fluorescent lighting, etc..) will not be
discussed. Although utility efficient devices have a definite
impact on reducing monthly utility consumption, this thesis
will focus on tenant incentives to conserve utilities and not
on actual utility conservation measures.
The costs of implementing the first four alternatives
will be those costs which are identified in the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense's report to Congress on the
feasibility of installing meters in all military housing
units. No original costs for the first four alternatives will
be derived in this thesis.
3. Assumptions
It is assumed that when utility consumption is
reduced, a corresponding reduction in utility costs is also
realized. It is implicitly assumed that the intent both of
P.L. 95-82 (1977) and the Navy's utility conservation policy
is to reduce operating expenses related to Navy military
housing.
This thesis presumes that the Navy would not benefit
from a utility conservation measure which decreased energy
consumption but required the same level of funding
expenditure. This assumption is based on the Navy's
requirement for an economic analysis and a specific payback
period before a conservation measure is approved. For
example, it would be illogical for the Navy to replace an
inefficient 400,000 Btu oil fired boiler with a new gas fired
boiler that could do the same job producing only 200,000 Btu
if higher operations and maintenance costs for the new boiler
offset fuel cost savings relative to the old boiler.
Conservation for conservation's sake is not the motivating
factor in conserving utilities - reduced operating costs
(money) is the motivating factor.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
1. Literature Review
The majority of research focuses on the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense's five alternatives proposed in
the March 1980 Congressional report. The foundation for this
thesis rests on the March 1980 Congressional report. This
report is presented from the perspective of a landlord. This
thesis analyzes the same alternatives from the perspective of
the tenant.
Lieutenant Walton [Ref. 4] examined the costs and
benefits of electricity metering at the Naval Postgraduate
School in 1972. His analysis indicated that individual meters
would be justified if metering could realize an annual savings
of electricity in the range of 2.1% to 7.4%. His thesis only-
analyzed the commercial/ industrial electricity consumption at
the Postgraduate School, not the electricity consumption at
the military housing complex. The thesis concluded that
similar analyses should be conducted at other Navy
installations to determine the amount of electricity savings
that would be required to justify metering. [Ref. 4]
This is a logical extension of Lt Walton's thesis, it
looks at the residential portion of the Naval Postgraduate
School but only looks at the benefit of metering utilities and
not the associated costs.
2 . Methodology
The primary method used in this thesis is archival
research. The five utility conservation alternatives
presented in the Congressional report of March 1980 has driven
this research toward articles published since 1977. These
articles deal with the utility conservation incentives
associated with master metered housing units.
This thesis assumes a direct analogy between master
metered civilian apartment units, where the landlord pays all
utility costs, and master metered military housing units,
where the Navy pays all utility costs. A small amount of data
on recent utility consumption was gathered to provide
realistic numerical examples for the implementing the five
alternatives.
Economic principles are then applied to each of the
five utility conservation alternatives to analyze which
alternative provides the tenants with the greatest incentive
to conserve utilities.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A glossary of commonly used terms is provided in
Appendix E.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter two will review the pertinent literature dealing
with utility conservation incentives. Navy
regulation/directives will be reviewed for pertinent Navy
energy conservation goals and policies. Current literature
concerning conservation incentives for master metered housing
units will be reviewed.
Chapter three will provide the reader with a background on
the March 1980 Congressional report, the demographic make up
of the La Mesa Village tenants and housing population, and
estimated reductions in utility consumption based on current
studies conducted in residential areas of the United States.
Chapter four will discuss the data collected for this
thesis and summarize the questions asked to support data
gathering.
Chapter five describes all five utility conservation
alternatives. The economic incentive for tenants to conserve
10
utilities will be analyzed for each alternative in a
subsection to the chapter. Each subsection will also include
a possible methodology to implement the alternative in La Mesa
Village. The discussion will conclude with the pros and cons
of each alternative from the tenant's perspective of
conserving utilities.
Chapter six will identify the alternative with the
greatest incentive for tenants to conserve utilities.
Recommendations for implementation and areas of further
research will conclude this chapter.
11
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Figure 1
Relationship of Utility Conservation Documents
Public Law 95-82 instructing DoD to meter all military
housing virtually died on the vine with DoD s reply in the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Housing) Report to the Congress: Family Housing Metering Test.
DoD's impetus to conserve utilities is driven by Executive
Order 12003 which spawned a series of OPNAV and NAVFAC
12




Eleven publications were reviewed to gain a
perspective on the level of commitment the Government has
towards utility conservation. An annotated bibliography has
been included at the end of this thesis for the reader who
wants a more in depth description of articles reviewed in this
chapter.
Two publications, Family Housing Energy Conservation
Handbook [Ref. 5] and CNET Instruction 4100. 3A [Ref. 6] are
both guidelines on how to cut energy costs. They suggest
specific utility conservation measures, such as lowering
thermostats and sealing up leaking window and door cracks.
These two publications will be referenced when Chapter V
discusses alternatives to provide feedback to housing
occupants.
Two legislative publications, Executive Order 12003
[Ref. 7] and Public Law 95-82 [Ref. 8] were basically the kick
in the pants DoD needed to start their utility conservation
program. DoD was directed by Executive Order 12 003 to reduce
energy consumption in existing federal buildings by 20 percent
during the period 1975 to 1985. Public Law 95-82 tasked DoD
13
to meter all family housing units and charge occupants for
excess utilities consumed.
The Report to the Congress: Family Housing Metering
Test [Ref. 3] was DoD ' s analysis and response to Congress on
the proposed metering of family housing units. This
publication provides the basis for this thesis. The DoD
family housing metering test outlined five utility
conservation alternatives from a landlord's perspective. This
thesis analyzes these same five alternatives from the
perspective of the tenant.
Three Navy instructions assess how well the Navy is
doing with its utility conservation program. CNET Instruction
4100. 3A [Ref. 6] outlines the Navy's initial goals of reducing
energy consumption by 20 percent by FY 1985, 25 percent by FY
1990, 30 percent by FY 1995, and 35 percent by FY 2000. OPNAV
Instruction 4100. 5C [Ref. 9] was published in 1986, after the
1985 goal of 20 percent was not met. This instruction revised
the Navy's energy reduction goals to 6 percent by FY 1990, 12
percent by FY 1995, and 15 percent by FY 2000. Comparing
these two Navy instructions shows how aggressive initial
conservation goals were. NAVFAC Instruction 4100.8A [Ref. 10]
outlines NAVFAC s Navy Family Housing energy conservation
policy.
Four publications dealing with the metering of Navy
Family Housing units or shore activities provide a perspective
on metering impacts on Navy housing occupants and Navy
14
conservation efforts. Costs and Benefits of Extensive
Electricity Metering at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey [Ref. 4] and Factors that Influence the
Implementation of Energy-Saving Technologies at Naval Shore
Facilities [Ref. 11] both point out that without an accurate
metering system, conservation efforts can not be properly
evaluated. Individuals can not be identified or held
responsible for wasteful practices. Furthermore, specific
conservation measures can not be properly measured for their
effectiveness in conserving utilities. Energy Conservation in
Navy Family Housing: A "Master-Metered" Approach [Ref. 12] and
Energy-Related Attitudes of Navy Family Housing Residents
[Ref. 13] relate data on Navy studies conducted on Housing
residents to assess the morale and financial impact of
metering.
2. Civilian Literature
Eleven publications were reviewed to gain knowledge on
expected utility conservation savings due to studies conducted
in the private sector.
Six publications discussed direct economic incentives
to tenants for conserving utilities. The first three, Effects
of Monetary Rebates, Feedback, and Information on Residential
Electricity Conservation [Ref. 14], Energy Demand Behavior in
a Master-Metered Apartment Complex: An Experimental Analysis
[Ref. 15], and A Group Contingency for Electricity
15
Conservation in Master-Metered Apartments [Ref. 16] showed
that financial incentives in master metered units could
provide up to a 12 percent savings in utility consumption.
The other three publications, Consumers Without a
Direct Economic Incentive to Conserve Energy [Ref. 17], Energy
Savings Attributable to Switching from Master Metering to
Individual Metering of Electricity [Ref. 18] and Effects of
Water Meters on Water Use [Ref. 19] provide data from the
private sector and economic theory to support the hypothesis
that individually metered dwellings realize substantial
utility savings over master-metered dwellings due to direct
economic incentives.
Feedback as a Means of Decreasing Residential Energy
Consumption [Ref. 20] and How Important is Information Format?
An Experimental Study of Home Energy Audit Programs [Ref. 21]
discuss the impact that feedback, education, and information
format has on housing occupants' utility consumption and
conservation.
The economic incentives for landlords and tenants to
initiate conservation measures are discussed in Energy
Conservation and the Rental Housing Market [Ref. 22],
Identifying Barriers to the Success of Consumer Energy
Conservation Policies [Ref. 23] and Energy Conservation in
Public Housing: It Can Work [Ref. 24].
16
This thesis draws conclusions from studies of these
private sector utility conservation efforts and applies them
to utility conservation efforts in DoD.
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis is primarily archival research applied to the
five alternatives presented to Congress in 1980 by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing)
.
The Government literature provides Navy energy conservation
policies and goals, while the civilian literature provides
data and economic principles which will be applied to the five
alternatives explored here.
The five alternatives the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense provided to Congress were from the incentive
perspective of a landlord who owns a master-metered apartment
complex. Looking at the same alternatives from the occupants'
point of view leads to a different recommendation if the goal
is to maximize energy reduction.
This thesis does not propose anything visionary,
revolutionary or startling. The purpose of this thesis is to
evaluate the economic incentives for occupants to conserve
utilities in master metered dwellings. The contribution of
this thesis is that it outlines logical economic principles
which could provide direct economic incentives to conserve
utilities in DoD family housing units.
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III. BACKGROUND
In 1977, responding to the energy crisis of 1973-74, both
Congress and the President of the United States instituted
legislation to control energy costs in Federal Government
Agencies. President Carter issued Executive Order 12003 which
provided energy reduction goals for federal activities. This
is still driving current energy reduction efforts within the
Federal Agencies. Congress attempted to help control energy
costs within DoD by authorizing P.L. 95-82 (1977) . This law
charged military family housing occupants for utilities
consumed in excess of a "norm" calculation.
A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12003
Executive Order 12003 was the first document to
effectively address the rising energy costs of the mid 1970s.
Related to energy policy and conservation, it was signed by
President Carter on 20 July 1977. Using 1975 energy
consumption figures as a baseline, Executive Order 12003
called for a 20 percent reduction in the average annual energy
use per gross square foot for all federally owned existing
buildings by 1985.
Executive Order 12003 spawned the OPNAV 44100.5 series of
instructions which outlined the Navy's energy reduction goals
18
and conservation policies. The initial OPNAV instruction,
using a 1975 energy consumption baseline, set energy reduction
goals of 20 percent by FY 1985, 25 percent by FY 1990, 30
percent by FY 1995, and 35 percent by FY 2000. Executive
Order 12003 only required a 20 percent reduction by 1985.
The OPNAV instructions spawned the NAVFAC 4100.8 series of
instructions. These outlined NAVFAC s energy reduction goals
and conservation policies for NAVFACENGCOM shore installations
including Navy Family Housing Units. To track the Navy's
progress in meeting its energy reduction goals, the Naval
Energy and Environmental Support Activity in Port Hueneme,
California was tasked with monitoring energy consumption in
the Navy's shore activities on a quarterly basis. By the
fourth quarter of 1985, the Navy shore establishment had only
realized a 9.02 percent reduction in energy consumption,
instead of the 20 percent goal.
In 1986, OPNAVINST 4100. 5C changed the energy reduction
baseline from 1975 energy usage levels to 1985 energy usage
levels. Each shore activity started FY 1986 with their fourth
quarter 1985 energy consumption level as their new baseline.
The instruction also modified the future energy reduction
goals to 6 percent by FY 1990, 12 percent by FY 1995, and 15
percent by FY 2000.
In 1988, NAVFACINST 4100. 8A promulgated the OPNAV
instruction's policies and goals to the Navy shore
establishment. The policy statement asserts that NAVFACENGCOM
19
shall conduct energy management programs in support of the
energy objectives and goals, including cost-effective metering
and control and management of facility energy systems to curb
waste. However, the NAVFAC policy statement ends with the
statement: "No restrictions shall be levied on Navy family
housing which would reduce quality of life below that normally
available to families in the civilian community.
"
[Ref. 10]
As previously mentioned, by 1985 the Navy shore activities
had only realized a 9.02 percent reduction in energy consumed
relative to 1975 energy consumption levels. By 1990, the Navy
shore activities had realized another 8.39 percent reduction
in energy consumption relative to the 1985 baseline. This
surpassed the established goal of a 6 percent reduction.
Currently (1992) , the Navy shore activities have realized a 12
percent reduction in energy consumption relative to the 1985
baseline. This meets the established 1995 12 percent
reduction goal. [Ref. 25] Pending policy changes within the
Navy may increase the 1995 energy reduction goal to 15 percent
and keep it at 15 percent through FY 2000. This complies with
the most recent Executive Order on Federal building energy
reduction goals.
B. PUBLIC LAW 95-82 (1977)
The second document which addressed rising energy costs
within the Department of Defense was Public Law 95-82. The
House Armed Services Committee Report 95-290 observed that
20
energy consumption by the occupants of military family housing
might exceed consumption in similar private sector housing by
more than 30 percent. In some cases, usage might be as much
as 50 percent higher. The report concluded that the only
practical program to control energy consumption would be to
change from master-metered units to individually-metered
units. Then occupants could be charged for excessive utility
usage. Congressional interest in stipulating meters for
military housing units and charging occupants for excess
energy consumption is not surprising due to the large
inventory of housing units in DoD (300,000 units). According
to the 1979 Department of Energy Report, DoD consumed 80.4
percent of the energy consumed by the Federal Government in FY
1978. [Ref. 26]
Public Law 95-101 appropriated $8,500,000 for DoD to
conduct a feasibility study on metering all military housing
units and charging occupants for excess energy consumption.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Housing) coordinated the feasibility study in which 10,379
housing units were metered, involving 19,279 meters.
21
TABLE 3-1
MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING SITES SELECTED
Military Number
Climate Service Location of Units
Hot, humid Air Force Little Rock AFB, AR 1,535
Army Fort Gordon, GA 597
Marine Corps MCAS Beaufort, SC 1,276
Hot, dry Air Force Cannon AFB, NM 1,012
Army Yuma Proving Ground, AZ 29
Moderate with Army Fort Eustis, VA 1,325
air condi-
tioning
Marine Corps MCDEC Quantico, VA 1,168
Moderate, with- Navy PMTC Point Mugu, CA 883
out air condi-
tioning
Navy CBC Port Hueneme, CA 214
Cold Navy NTC Great Lakes, IL 2,076
Total 10,376
A total of 19,279 meters were installed at a total
cost for design and installation of $5,407,575, for an
average installation cost of $521 per unit metered or $280
per meter installed. There was, however, considerable
variation in the cost of metering individual units from a
low of $129 to a high of $5,536 per unit. 1226 units
estimated to be extremely expensive to meter were dropped
from the test program, leaving 10,376 units metered. It
was estimated that in certain cases costs to install
necessary meters would have exceeded $35,000 per unit.
[Ref. 3:pg 7-1]
Concurrent with the design and installation of meters
was the creation of a computerized billing system. To charge
occupants for excess energy consumption, a "norm" calculation
or energy consumption ceiling was compared with actual
22
occupant energy consumption. The norm was broken down into
six major energy loads: appliances and lighting; cooking;
domestic hot water; pilot lights; heating and air
conditioning; and miscellaneous energy consumption. Each one
of these six major energy load norms was based on technical
factors specific to each housing unit. Technical factors
included building construction type, heating fuel type, number
of bedrooms, square footage of windows, building insulation,
window and door drafting, etc. . . The algorithm to calculate
one norm for one housing unit for a 30-day billing period
involved 21 calculations and 289 pieces of data. Data
requirements increased if the billing period was extended or
there was more than one utility servicing a housing unit.
By 1 September 1978, the meters had been installed, the
norm algorithm tested and the mock billing operation
commenced. From September 1978 to December 1979, monthly
energy consumption data was gathered at the ten sites. Mock
bills were generated and sent to housing occupants residing in
the 10,376 surveyed units participating.
The metering feasibility study ended December 1979. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense submitted a report to
the Congress: Family Housing Metering Test, on 1 March 1980.
The Report to the Congress estimated that metering all
remaining family housing units in DoD and instituting a
monthly energy billing system would cost:
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• $415,000,000 to meter all 300,000 remaining units,
• $ 50,000,000 to purchase minicomputers and software to
perform the norm calculations and produce
bills,
• $ 32,000,000 annual cost to read and maintain all
meters,
• $ 23,000,000 occupant education and increased occupant
generated maintenance service calls,
• $118,000,000 replacement cost due to negative retention
and morale aspects of metering
In keeping with Congress' intention to provide energy
conservation incentives to military family housing occupants,
the Report to the Congress proposed four alternatives to
reduce energy consumption in family housing. The first three
alternatives all involve individual metering of housing units.
This was shown in Table III-2 to be prohibitively expensive.
The fourth alternative was "business as usual," except
existing buildings and equipment would be retrofitted with
energy conservation measures (attic insulation, double paned
windows, low water flow devices, electronic ignition vs pilot
lights). In addition, occupant education programs would be
instituted on energy conservation practices.
The summary and recommendations of the Family Housing
Metering Test concluded,
The result of the metering test suggest that the
legislation as now written should not be implemented.
While retrofitting existing housing for metering and
billing occupants is feasible, though extremely costly,
the norm for determining appropriate energy allowances is
not sufficiently accurate to bill individuals. The
Department of Defense has concluded, based on results of
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tests, that the best approach to energy conservation in
family housing is a combination of continuing aggressive
consumer eduction coupled with increased emphasis on
energy conservation facility improvement. [Ref . 3: pg ES-1]
C. FAMILY HOUSING POLICY
It is current practice for the Government to provide
military housing for its service members. Service members who
accept Government guarters do not receive BAQ (Basic Allowance
for Quarters) or VHA (Variable Housing Allowance) . Instead
the service member receives housing at no cost and all
utilities are paid by the Government. Occupants are




This analysis takes the approach that the Report to the
Congress: Family Housing Metering Test (March 1980) was
written from the perspective of the landlord, considering
economic incentives for landlords. It did not consider
economic incentives for the tenant. Analyzing alternative
economic incentives helps identify which alternative provides
the tenant with the greatest incentive to conserve utilities.
This thesis investigates the four alternative economic
incentives provided in the Report to the Congress: Family
Housing Metering Test. Each alternative and its corresponding
economic incentive for utility conservation is presented and
analyzed.
The alternative analysis of the economic incentives makes
this research effort primarily archival. Data on monthly
utility consumption was obtained from the La Mesa Housing
Office, the Naval Postgraduate School Public Works Department
and the Naval Energy and Environmental Support Office in Port
Hueneme.
The literature on energy reduction studies is used to
support arguments that individual metering creates
approximately a 20 percent in utility consumption. In Chapter
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V, recent literature is referenced to support this estimate
and make analytical projections on projected savings at La
Mesa Village.
This thesis is designed to gather energy consumption data
which hopefully shows little conservation effort. Then using
current literature on utility reduction studies, the
hypothesis is presented that individual metering and payments
provides the greatest economic incentive for tenants to
conserve utilities. Then, an individual metering concept is
applied to La Mesa Village. This helps show which alternative
provides the greatest economic incentive for tenant utility
conservation.
B. DEMOGRAPHICS OF LA MESA VILLAGE
La Mesa Village is the military housing area for officer
students attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. La Mesa Village consists of 878 family dwellings
incorporated into 323 buildings. All dwellings use
electricity for lighting and appliances. Natural gas is used
for cooking, heating and hot water heating. The electrical
distribution system and natural gas distribution system for La
Mesa Village are master metered supplies from Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, a commercial utility. Water service to La
Mesa Village is provided by two master metered supplies from
California - American Water Company, a commercial utility. A
27
breakdown of the number of units in each building is provided
in Table 4-1 and Appendix A.
TABLE 4-1
LA MESA VILLAGE DWELLING UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS












La Mesa Village started in 1952 when the original 176
buildings were completed and named Wherry Housing. Wherry
Housing ranged from single dwellings to buildings with up to
five dwellings. In 1961, an additional 94 buildings were
constructed and named Capehart Housing. These dwellings
ranged from single units to duplexes. In 1965, 30 buildings
were constructed and named '65 Housing. These units ranged
from three dwelling buildings up to ten dwelling buildings.
In 1969, 23 more buildings were constructed and named '69
Housing. These buildings range from four dwelling units up to
eight unit dwelling units.
As of 30 July 1992, the population of La Mesa Village
included 834 service members and a total population of 2,954.
This population level equates to a 95.09 percent housing
occupancy rate at La Mesa Village. Forty-four dwellings were
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vacant as of 30 July 1992. The La Mesa Village population is
broken down by family size in Table 4-2.
TABLE 4-2










Sponsor Dependent Pop Total
148 148 296
260 520 780





Total 834 2,120 2,954
The Monterey Peninsula is a coastal area which receives 14
to 22 inches of rainfall each year. The possibility of a
drought is strong in any given year with ten or fewer inches
of rainfall constituting a dry year. Two dry years in a row
uses up much of the water in the reservoirs, drawing heavily
on the groundwater and depleting the reserve buffer of water
in the aquifer. The water utility's deliveries have
historically increased at an average rate of 3 percent per
year. Current District projections indicate that demand will
exceed the 22,000 acre feet of estimated water supply by the
year 2000. The Peninsula is expected to have a serious water
supply problem. [Ref. 27]
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C. SOURCES OF DATA
1. Public Works Department
The Public Works Department at the Naval Postgraduate
School provided monthly energy consumption figures through the
Energy Audit Report. The data started with the fourth quarter
FY 91 and went back three years to the second quarter FY 88.
These Energy Audit Reports provided electricity and natural
gas monthly consumption data for La Mesa Village.
2. Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity
The Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity in
Port Hueneme, California provided Energy Audit Reports for La
Mesa Village from the first quarter FY 88 back to the first
quarter FY 84.
3. La Mesa Village Housing Office
The Housing Office at La Mesa Village provided water
usage data for the period July 1992 back to January 1989. The
Housing Office also listed energy related construction
contracts completed over the last 15 years at La Mesa Village,
although no dollar values could be associated with projects
before 1985.
D. QUESTIONS
The Public Works Department was asked for utility
consumption data.
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The Housing Office at La Mesa Village was asked for
building and population demographics. The Housing Office also
provided water utility consumption data and energy related
construction efforts.
The Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity
(NEESA) provided utility consumption data and explained how
the 1985 utility baseline was established. NEESA also
provided information on the Navy's progress at meeting its
energy reduction goals.
Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command in
San Bruno, California provided information on new housing
construction metering requirements.
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V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
A. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
This thesis examines alternatives presented by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) in
the Report to the Congress: Family Housing Metering Test to
determine which provides the greatest economic incentive for
family housing occupants to conserve utilities.
Before assessing the five utility reduction alternatives,
two general issues concerning meter installation will be
discussed. The first concerns individual versus master
metering. The second is DoD ' s opposition to individual
metering in family housing units. These discussions provide
a foundation for comparing the five alternatives.
1. Individual versus Master Metering
a. Metering
Family housing units in DoD are currently master-
metered. Government dwellings have a single meter to measure
utilities (gas, electricity or water) consumed by the
dwellings on the military base. Tenants who live in
government housing receive no basic allowance for quarters
(BAQ) , but they pay no utility costs.
Individual metering, on the other hand, uses a
separate meter for each utility for each dwelling. Each
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dwelling's utility consumption is read on a monthly basis for
billing purposes.
Submetered dwellings use one meter for sections,
buildings, floors or multiple units to supplement (or check)
a master-meter. Submetering is essentially master-metering on
a very small scale.
Of the five alternatives examined, four involve
metering. The one alternative that the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense recommended to Congress was the only
alternative that did not involve metering.
Table 5-1 outlines numerous studies conducted in
the 1970s and 1980s concerning feedback effects on occupants
and their utility consumption patterns. These studies
indicate substantial quantity savings can be realized if
accurate utility consumption data is presented to housing




Author Utility Year Savings
Brown and Caldwell Water 1984 20.0%
Nelson Electricity 1981 20.0%
Seligman and Darley Electricity 1977 10.5%
Winett, Kagel, Battalio, Winkler Electricity 1978 12.0%
Craig and McCann Electricity 1980 35.0%
Slavin, Wodarski, Blackburn Electricity 1981 11.2%
Counihan and Nemtzow Electricity 1979 26.0%
Gas 1979 7.0%
Ritschard and Dickey Fuel Oil 1974 50.0%
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Not only do the studies in Table 5-1 indicate
substantial savings by simply providing occupants with utility
consumption data but Naw publications since 1977 identify
metering and occupant feedback as critical to energy
conservation programs.
Lt Walton's research in 1977 identified:
A major one [problem of utility conservation] is the
lack of verifiable feedback to the responsible managers
for electricity consuming activities on an individual
base. . . . Few electricity meters exist and they are
situated to reveal the whole installation's consumption or
that of several buildings or a large area within the base.
As a result, the base utilities conservation manager has
no ability to identify consumption in individual areas
except through the use of engineering estimates. . . .
Therefore, without the ability to identify consumption
within the limits of lower echelon manager responsibility,
an internal waster goes undetected because of another's
conservation effort. [Ref. 4:pg 15]
The 1979 Energy-Related Attitudes of Navy Family
Housing Residents study conducted by the Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center in San Diego, concluded:
The system variables having the greatest inhibiting
effects on conservation included the construction and
maintenance of housing and the lack of information
concerning cost and consumption. System variables seen as
having the greatest positive effect on conservation were
those related to information and experience. From these
results, it is apparent that an energy conservation
program would best be of an educational nature,
emphasizing development of proconservation attitudes and
providing information regarding energy-efficient
practices, utility consumption, and costs. (Emphasis
added) [Ref. 13:pg 17]
The Navy publication most critical of Navy energy-
conserving technology was the 1985 document Factors That
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Influence the Implementation of Energy-Saving Technologies at
Naval Shore Facilities [Ref. 11] published by the Naval Civil
Engineering Laboratory in Port Hueneme, California. According
to this report:
Metering of energy use is strikingly inadequate at
Naval shore facilities. Without meters, problem energy
users can not be identified. Even conservative energy
users (would-be energy savers) cannot determine the
results of their efforts at improving efficiency without
knowledge of this consumption. In fact, 50% of the
military respondents to an energy questionnaire identified
the inability to measure energy savings as a major
obstacle to the adoption of new energy-saving
technologies. [Ref. ll:pg 10]
It is true that meters, in and of themselves, do not
save energy. It is equally true, however that without the
consumption information provided by meters, it is very
difficult to assess the effects of energy conservation
efforts and to determine whether these efforts are cost-
effective. Even if metering were successfully installed,
personnel may find little or no individual incentive to
conserve because individual users cannot be identified or
charged accordingly. [Ref. ll:pg 21]
With all the literature on the benefits of
individual vice master metering, including Navy studies, DoD
continues to insist on master metering for its military family
housing units. Proponents of energy conservation strongly
endorse a policy of removing hidden costs and thus charging
consumers the full expense of supplying energy [Ref. 22:pg
1112] .
A study conducted by Craig and McCann showed:
master metered individuals were significantly more
likely to engage in energy wasting behaviors.
Specifically, they were more likely to leave the lights,
television and air conditioner on when no one was directly
using them. Consequently, this group is an important
target for programs aimed at influencing consumption.
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While individuals living in single-metered dwellings
should not be ignored, the price mechanism functions
normally, providing feedback on consumption and more
importantly a direct economic incentive to conserve. [Ref
.
17:pg 165]
In a curious twist of events, Congress realized
that direct economic incentives did promote utility
conservation. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA) requires that each state's public utilities
commission (PUC) consider prohibiting or restricting master
metering of electric service in new buildings. By 1980, the
PUCs of 31 states had banned or discouraged master metering.
[Ref. 22:pg 1119]
One unique advantage of individual metering is
identifying utility overhead. With the actual quantities of
utilities that tenants consume each month, the Housing
Administration can easily determine the amount of electricity
lost due to line loss or the amount of gas or water lost due
to leaking pipes and valves. With master metering, consistent
utility loss would go undetected until a catastrophic event
occurred, such as electrocution, fire, explosion or the
undermining of a building foundation. Such an event would
identify the nature of the utility loss.
b. Billing
With the individual metering scenario, billing is
relatively simple. Dwelling meters are read on a monthly
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basis (gas, water and electricity) and the occupant is charged
according to the established utility rate.
Under the master-metered or submetered scenario,
utility costs can be allocated through a system known as RUBS
- the Resident Utility Billing System. RUBS allocates space
conditioning and electricity costs on a dwelling's square-foot
basis. Although RUBS does not currently include water costs,
water costs could be allocated based on a dwelling's
population. Each occupant would pay a percentage of the total
utility bill corresponding to their square footage (gas and
electricity) and family size (water). [Ref. 22:pg 1114]
The RUBS allocation system is not as precise or
equitable as using individual meters but is considerably less
expensive to implement. With RUBS allocation, tenants still
face an incentive problem of consuming more than they pay for
as explained by Weimer and Vining. Weimer and Vining use the
example of an evenly split restaurant bill to clarify why
individuals in common property situations have an incentive to
respond to marginal private cost rather than marginal social
cost.
Imagine that you are in a restaurant with a group of
ten people who have agreed to split the bill evenly. If
you were paying for your own tab, then you would not order
the fancy dessert costing ten dollars unless you expected
to get at least ten dollars' worth of value from eating
it. But because the actual cost to you of the dessert
will be one dollar (the average increase in your bill and
for the bills of everyone else in the group)
,
you would be
rational (ignoring calories, your remaining stomach
capacity, and social pressure) to consume it as long as it
would give you at least one more dollar in value. You
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might continue ordering desserts until the value you
placed on one more fell to one dollar. In other words,
the individual's out-of-pocket cost for an additional
dessert is the increment to his or her bill that is
determined by the consumption averaged over the group.
But this result is clearly inefficient because you and
everyone else in the group could be made better off if you
refrained from ordering the last dessert in return for a
payment from the others of an amount between one dollar
(your marginal private cost) and nine dollars (the
difference between the marginal social cost and the
marginal private cost that you perceive) . Remember that
the problem arises here because you have access to items
on the menu at below their prices, which equal their
marginal social costs. [Ref. 28:pg. 54]
The RUBS allocation system for submetered
dwellings would be comparable to breaking the restaurant group
in the previous example, into two groups of five people or
smaller groups. With two groups of five people, your marginal
private cost for the ten dollar dessert increases to two
dollars instead of the previous one dollar. The remaining
eight dollars are shared equally by four other people instead
of the previous nine. The concept of submetering dwellings is
to reduce the number of tenants on one utility bill vice all
the tenants being on one utility bill as in the master metered
dwellings.
2. Navy Opposition to Individual Metering
a . Installation
Most military family dwellings were constructed in
multiple units without considering individual metering.
Utilities were usually installed in the most economical
method, for a master-metering scheme. Isolating utilities for
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each dwelling and installing individual meters would be a
monumental undertaking.
The total implementation of a DoD-wide metering program
is estimated to require between 5 and 6 years. The
estimated cost of metering the remaining 300,000-odd units
of DoD housing in the 50 states and U.S. possessions is
$415,177,000 in 1981 dollars. [Ref. 3
:
pg 7-8]
DoD responded to Congress' proposal to meter and
charge occupants for excess consumption to the literal extent
of the legislation and not to the intent of the Congressional
legislation. Responding to the proposed legislation, DoD
estimated it would cost $415 Million to individually meter all
remaining family housing dwellings. If DoD had responded to
the Congressional intention, DoD would have proposed to
individually meter dwellings where economically feasible.
They would submeter buildings where individual metering was
prohibitively costly. Then occupants could be billed
according to RUBS.
Using La Mesa Village as an example, Table 5-2
compares the costs of individually metering and submetering
buildings. It would cost $196,560 to install 702 individual
meters in the 117 duplex units (Building 2)
.
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It would cost $98,280 to install 351 submeters in the same 117
duplex units.
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TABLE 5-2
COSTS OF INDIVIDUALLY VS SUBMETERED DWELLINGS
Metering Costs (meters)
Units/Bldg # of Bldg Individual Submeter
1 80 $ 67,200 (240) $ 67,200 (240)
2 117 $196,560 (702) $ 98, 280 (351)
3 17 $ 42,840 (153) $ 14,280 ( 51)
4 72 $241,920 (864) $ 60,480 (216)
5 12 $ 50,400 (180) $ 10, 080 ( 36)
6 18 $ 90,720 (324) $ 15, 120 ( 54)




5 $ 33,600 (120) $ 4,200 ( 15)
1 $ 8,400 ( 30) $ 840 ( 3)
323 $737,520 (2634) $271,320 (969)
Based on the installation of 3 meters (gas, water and
electricity)
Based on the average installation cost of $280 per meter
In Table 5-2, submetering all buildings at La
Mesa Village appears to cost a third what it would cost to
individually meter dwellings. This assumes that the average
installation cost of each meter is $280. This greatly
simplifies the calculation for individual meter installation
in the larger dwellings (4 or more dwellings) which the Family
Housing Metering Test showed could cost as much as $35,000.
If this same ratio, 0.3678 ($271,320 / $737,520) is applied to
the DoD wide estimate of $415 Million it would appear that all
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DoD family housing buildings could be submetered for





The Report to the Congress: Family Housing
Metering Test argues:
Any change or penalty for military occupants for whom
all energy was previously included in the rent will have
definite morale impact with accompanying personnel
retention considerations. ... As a measure of the
possible cost impact, an attrition of 1/4 of one percent
of career military personnel as a result of a metering
program would cost $118,000,000 for replacement of these
experienced midrange management personnel. [Ref . 3:pg 7-25]
DoD also estimates that 15 percent of the military
housing population under the proposed legislation would exceed
a "norm" allowance and be required to pay for excess consumed
utilities. The cost of utilities to occupants and its
subsequent effect on personnel retention will be discussed
under each alternative.
c. Monthly Meter Readings
(1) Personnel Cost
It is estimated that DoD would need an
additional 487 employees to read meters at the 424 DoD
activities. This would cost $13 Million in FY 1987 dollars.
[Ref. 3:3-42] Included in the $32 Million annual cost of
metering is not only the meter reader salaries but meter




The norm criteria developed during the DoD
metering test were set to provide family housing residents in
military housing with a quality of life comparable to military
families living in civilian housing. Still, the norm does not
quantify or model the complex aspects of human behavior, nor
does it provide a means of comparing military family life with
life in the civilian sector. [Ref. 3:pg 7-10]
It is commendable that the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense insists on preserving equity between the
quality of life for military families living in military
housing units and those living in rental housing. However,
the quality of life in the two housing environments cannot be
compared when two different incentives for the conservation of
utilities are in effect and may not have been equal to begin
with.
The tenant living in rental housing has access
to large quantities of utilities, provided he pays for all
utilities consumed. The amount of utilities he consumes is
proportional to the value he places on the utilities. The
tenant living in government quarters, under any alternative
except number two, is subject to an educational program and a
military housing community atmosphere. This atmosphere
implies that a "good tenant" voluntarily sacrifices or
controls his consumption in order to conserve government
utility costs. In order for the Housing Administration to
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realize utility savings, tenants must voluntarily forego the
consumption of desired utilities, this implies the quality of
life in military housing decreases relative to the quality of
life in rental housing.
The complex utility norm is another instance
where DoD has taken Congressional intent to an extreme. The
algorithm to calculate a single utility norm for one housing
unit over a 30-day period involves 289 pieces of data and
entails 21 calculations [Ref. 3:pg 6-3]. The norm calculation
for each housing location could be simplified by dividing up
the quantity of utilities consumed over the housing
population. Electricity and gas norms for each dwelling could
be allocated by number of bedrooms (See Table 5-3) with
water allocated per person. Appendix B shows an example norm
calculation for La Mesa Village.
TABLE 5-3
EXAMPLE NORMS FOR LA MESA VILLAGE
Electricity Gas
2 Bedrooms 475 Kwhr/month 6900 KBtu/month
3 Bedrooms 605 Kwhr/month 7950 KBtu/month
4 Bedrooms 670 Kwhr/month 9150 KBtu/month
Water set at 80 gallons per person per day.
Using generic norms places utility norms on
the same quality of life basis as basic allowance for quarters
(BAQ) and basic allowance of subsistence (BAS) . How this
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simplified norm affects tenants will be discussed under each
alternative.
(3) Billing
Eliminating the 300 variable norm calculations
and using the generic utility allowances derived in Appendix
B, would simplify monthly billing calculations. They could be
maintained and processed on PC computers using almost any
spreadsheet program.
Buildings that are submetered could be billed
in two ways. Each dwelling could be billed directly for its
proportional share of gas and electricity based on its
proportionate square footage. The water bill would be
apportioned to each dwelling according to the number of people
in residence. The second method would assign a utility
representative from each building to fairly apportion the
monthly utility bill among the building tenants. With the
second method, each building is billed strictly on the utility
meter readings and the tenants themselves would work out what
they considered a fair distribution of utility costs.
Possible billing procedures will be addressed
under the implementation section of each alternative.
d. Service Calls
With occupants paying utility costs, occupant
education and increased occupant generated maintenance service
calls are estimated to cost over $23,000,000 annually.
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This estimated $23 Million annual education and
service cost exists regardless of the metering alternative
chosen. Under the metering alternatives with no education or
utility costs to occupants, this $23 Million annual cost is
being lost in other ways. When occupants receive no education
and do not pay any utility bills, the $23 Million annual
savings in education and service calls is being lost by the
Housing Administration through drafty houses, leaking faucets,
and inefficient household appliances.
B. ALTERNATIVE I: METER / BILLING OF EXCESS CONSUMPTION
1. Description
This alternative is the most literal interpretation of
the congressional direction provided in 1977. Each
housing unit would be individually metered and consumption
data collected monthly. DoD would develop a norm
(ceiling) which would serve as a standard describing its
interpretation of the maximum amount of each utility a
given family should utilize considering family size. The
consumption data would then be compared to the norm and
the occupant would be billed monthly for any utility
consumed above the norm.[Ref. 3:pg 8-1]
2 . Economic Analysis
a . Theory
This alternative is essentially a failed market
mechanism with a punitive measure as an attempted correction.
The occupant incurs a cost for total utility consumption in
excess of the utility allowance. The Report to the Congress
states,
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It is projected that the feedback received by 85
percent of the residents would reduce that group's
consumption by 4 percent. The consumption attributed to
excess usage by the 15 percent above the norm is projected
to drop far enough that an additional 2 percent of the
total family housing energy would be saved. Not all
excessive users would drop below the norm because of the
lack of sufficient incentive to change their lifestyle.
[Ref. 3:pg 8-2]
From an economic viewpoint, the tenant has no
incentive to conserve. If utilities are a limited resource
which usually involve competition (cost) , then we find ourself
in an unusual market where the consumer receives a free good
up to a specific limit. The only incentive for consumers to
reduce consumption of a free good is either that the consumer
tires of the free good and voluntarily changes his consumption
behavior or external factors like advertising, propaganda, and
eduction cause a sense of guilt when the occupant consumes
more of the free good than necessary for basic comfort.
The family housing metering test estimated that
occupants consuming below the utility allowances would
decrease their consumption an additional 4 percent simply
because they receive information on their utility consumption.
In the present non-metered housing environment, occupants do
not have individual consumption data. The concerned occupant
without utility use information may wash his car quarterly and
water his lawn every other week during the summer. With
accurate individual utility use information, more occupants
may feel they are doing their part for conservation if they do
not exceed their allowance. Occupants may increase their
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consumption up to their allowance level. Under this scenario,
utility usage at La Mesa Village would increase with most
occupants consuming their allowance. The only reward for
under consuming utilities is good feelings for conserving the
world's natural resources.
Jb. Example
Using the norms established in Appendix C, this
alternative will be illustrated using a family of four living
in a 3 bedroom house. According to Appendix C, this family













Assuming our example family consumes 15 percent
more of each utility, and pays for the excess at the specified
unit cost, the monthly utility bill would be:




695.7 Kwhr 605.0 Kwhr 90.7 Kwhr $ 5.80
9142.5 KBtU 7950.0 KBtu 1192.5 KBtu $16.69
11040.0 Gals 9600.0 Gals 1440.0 Gals $ 4.32
Total $26.81
The family housing occupant might perceive that
the $26.81 excess utility consumption payment is the total
monthly utility bill. While this alternative provides
appropriate conservation incentives on the margin by requiring
residents to pay 100 percent of their above norm utility
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consumption, military families do not typically think
marginally or in terms of excess costs. Military families do
not discuss monthly food bills as being, "$150 in excess of
BAS". Families think of housing rental costs and food in
terms of total monthly costs. Rent is described as $700 a
month plus utilities, not $200 a month plus utilities in
excess of BAQ.
When a military family receives an allowance for
rent or food, the money becomes part of the total family
financial resource pool. Expenditures on rent or food then
draw from the entire family financial resource pool with full
economic impact of its cost on alternative economic choices.
3. Implementation
a. Billing
Under Alternative I, military housing occupants
would receive a monthly bill for utilities consumed in excess
of an established norm. With a generic norm similar to BAQ,
utility billings would be a trivial process of comparing the
monthly meter reading with the norm and charging the occupant
a preset rate for his excess utilities.
With such a simplified billing process, most
existing housing offices could generate and monitor utility
bills with existing computer assets and spreadsheet programs
like Lotus 1-2-3 or Quattro Pro. The computer billing program
would be based on total utility consumption rather than
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individual utility consumption. For example, a tenant
consuming more electricity and water than the norm, but less





Usage Norm Delta Cost
705 Kwhr 605 Kwhr 100 Kwhr $ 6.40
7200 KBtu 7950 KBtu (750) KBtu ($10.50)
10800 Gals 9600 Gals 1200 Gals $ 3.60
Total ($ 0.50)
Tenant's Bill $ 0.00
b. Effect on Tenants
In passing Public Law 95-82, Congress intended to
change utility costs above a norm for military housing
occupants. The desired effect was lowering utility
consumption below the norm. Congress never intended to evict
military housing occupants for utility consumption in excess
of the norm.
The example in V.B.2.b showed that utility costs
up to the norm, which amounted to $178.82, were paid by DoD.
This is a utility subsidy by DoD to all military housing
occupants. It is not provided to military members living in
rental housing. In the example, the resident who over
consumes by 15 percent is only assessed a charge of $26.81.
This minuscule charge for such a large utility
consumption would have a positive effect on the morale of the
military housing occupant if their only other option is to
move out of military housing into the rental housing market.
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In the rental market, occupants bear the full utility cost
burden, $205.63.
Under this alternative, billing errors are a
significant concern to military housing tenants. These errors
are not self-correcting as they are in the rental housing
community.
If the civilian consumer is erroneously overcharged one
month, a presumably correct meter reading the next month
will yield an offsetting undercharge. However, military
members under the proposed system would be "starting with
a clean slate" each month, because their consumption would
be measured against an absolute usage norm for each given
month. Without cash credits for consumption below the
monthly norm, an undetected erroneous overcharge would be
irretrievably forfeited. [Ref. 3:pg 6-5]




Metering with billing for excess utility
consumption has two advantages: this alternative would be
transparent to the majority of military housing occupants
(85%) who are usually below the norm and cash receipts would
only be expected from 15 percent of the military housing
occupants, implying that the administrative and accounting
burden on the Housing Administration would be minimal.
b Cons
There are four disadvantages of this alternative.
First, there is no incentive for military housing occupants
already below the norm to conserve further. Residents may
view the norm as an allowance or right and increase
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consumption up to the norm. Furthermore, it is financially
prudent for large utility consumers to live in military
housing because they receive a utility subsidy up to the norm.
The second disadvantage is that all occupants must
receive consumption information to evaluate whether they are
exceeding the norm and to stimulate utility consumption
behavior modification. Costs of metering, meter reading, and
education cannot be reduced by only providing information to
the 15 percent that over consume utilities because under
consumers may increase their consumption until they get a
bill.
The third disadvantage is that an ongoing
educational program is required to incentivise residents to
conserve utilities through guilt. Even with an established
norm, money must be continually spent on conservation
education to entice all occupants to conserve further. This
educational process has the potential of costing more than the
realized savings of the conservation efforts.
The fourth disadvantage is that billing errors
cannot be corrected in future months under this punitive
system. Each resident's utility usage is wiped clean after
comparing it with the utility norm.
51
C. ALTERNATIVE II: METER WITH FULL PAYMENT
1. Description
Metering with full payment is identical to the method
used by public utilities to sell energy to individual home
residents. Each family unit would be individually metered
and the consumption data collected periodically, typically
monthly.
Every occupant would then be billed for all the energy
consumed during the billing period. The rates charged for
the energy could be the adjusted cost to the base. An
added fee based on actual cost could be charged for late
or delinquent payment. [Ref. 3:pg 8-5]
2. Economic Analysis
a . Theory
This is the only one of the five alternatives
analyzed that has a functional market mechanism; the purchaser
of the utilities is also the consumer. With full payment for
utilities, tenants in military housing and tenants in rental
housing would both face the payments and economic incentives
to conserve. However, requiring military housing occupants to
pay for utilities on a monthly basis would have an immediate
impact. An occupant living in government quarters and paying
for utilities would see himself at a financial disadvantage
compared to military members living in rental housing if he
lost his BAQ and VHA allowances. Housing occupants would
likely expect a rent rollback to compensate for the added
utility bill.
Full utility payment without some form of utility
allowance would place a financial burden on tenants living in
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military housing. Living in government guarters would be less
financially prudent. The remainder of the analysis for this
alternative assumes that rents are rolled back to compensate
military housing occupants for their newly acguired
responsibility for utility bills.
Counihan and Nemtzow discussed the economic
incentives that motivate renters to adopt conservation
measures
.
If a tenant is to make any financial gain from a
conservation investment in an individually metered
building, it must be from savings on utility expenses.
The net result is that only the most inexpensive or
portable conservation measures will attract a renter's
interest. Examples are weatherstripping, caulking, shower
flow restrictors, water heater blankets, and insulating
drapes or window coverings. Tenants may be reluctant to
invest in such measures if they doubt their future value;
drapes, for example, might not fit the windows in the next
unit. [Ref. 22:pg 1120]
The tenant would realize financial gains by
modifying his behavior to lower his monthly utility bill. The
landlord (the government in this case) would realize lower
operating costs by improving utility efficiencies in the unit
like, fireplace dampers, high efficiency furnaces, water flow
restrictors, high efficiency refrigerators, electronic
ignition for gas appliances and units retrofitted to utilize
fluorescent lighting. Full utility payment by tenants
highlights a distinction between the tenant's and the
landlord's conservation responsibilities. The tenant focuses
his conservation effort on his consumption behavior. The
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value he places on the utilities would be reflected in the
monthly utilities he purchases. The landlord focuses his
conservation effort on the building's utility efficiency. By
improving the building's utility efficiency, the landlord (the
government in this case) could lower the utilities rent




This alternative will be illustrated with the same
example used for Alternative I. Using the same norms, our
family of four living in a 3 bedroom unit would receive a
$178.82 utility allowance.




605 Kwhr/month $0.064/Kwhr $ 38.72
7950 KBtu/month $0.014/KBtu $111.30
9600 Gals/month $0.003/Gal $ 28.80
Total $178.82
The occupant consuming his entire utility
allowance would pay $178.82 per month. Tenants consuming less
would realize the direct economic incentive of lower utility
bills and more funds to spend on other goods. Those tenants
who place a high value on utilities could consume and pay for
more utilities. They would spend more than their utility
allowance. Consequently, they would have less money for other
goods.
This situation is similar to current BAQ and VHA
allowances. Military service members who choose to live in
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rental housing receive BAQ and VHA to cover rent and utility
costs. Tenants who spend less than their BAQ and VHA rates on
rent and utilities have excess funds available to spend on
other goods. Tenants whose monthly rent and utilities exceed
their BAQ and VHA rates end up spending part of their monthly
salary. Hence, they have less money available for other
goods.
The norm in Appendix C was established by
distributing the current La Mesa Village utility consumption
over the housing population. The norm calculation method
provides utility norms comparable to utilities consumed in
rental dwellings. Utility norms could be gradually reduced to
allow the government to reach some preset utility conservation
goal. Let's say 65 percent of La Mesa Village residents are
6 percent below their norm, 20 percent of the residents are 12
percent below their norm and 15 percent of the residents are
15 percent above their norm. To encourage utility
conservation, the norms could be reduced by 10 percent which
would have the following impact on tenants and the government.
Norm Unit Cost Cost 10% Red Cost
Elec : 605 Kwhr $0. 064 $ 38.72 544 Kwhr $ 34.82
Gas : 7950 Kbtu $0. 014 $111.30 7155 KBtu $100.17
Water: 9600 Gals $0. 003 $ 28.80 8640 Gals $ 25.92
Total $178.82 $160.91
This example shows that the resident's utility
allowance drops from $178.82 to $160.91 if the government's
goal is a 10 percent utility reduction. This has a direct
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economic impact on the tenant if he wishes to consume the same
amount of utilities as before the utility reduction. This
utility reduction would have an immediate impact on government
funding since the government would realize the $17.91 monthly
savings in the utility allowance.
The opposite would also become apparent when
utility rates increase. An increase in utility rates by the
utility companies would have to be reflected in each tenant's
utility allowance if the utility allowance is to remain a fair
economic incentive to tenants. Periodically reevaluating the
utility allowance would be similar to periodically
reevaluating rental cost allowances in the civilian community.
Through a periodic questionnaire of military member's living
costs in rental dwellings, DoD readjusts the military member's
BAQ and VHA rates throughout the United States based on the
local community's cost of living.
3. Implementation
a. Billing
The billing process under this alternative would
be no more complicated than under Alternative I. The only
difference is that all military housing occupants would have
to pay monthly utility bills. The Housing Administration
would require an accounting department large enough to handle
the monthly billing and collection process.
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The simplest billing procedure allows the local
utility companies to read the meters and bill the residents.
In the case of submetered building complexes, one resident
could receive the utility bill for the building and collect
payments from the remaining tenants through an apportionment
system as described previously.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense decided
not to have local utility companies bill military tenants
directly, for three reasons:
First, hundreds of utility companies would be involved
because most housing units have at least two sources of
energy, for example, electricity and gas. Secondly,
tremendous modifications on a large scale would be
required to incorporate the norm concept into all the
existing billing systems, and it is doubtful that any
utility companies would agree to make the changes and
assume responsibility for the metering. Thirdly, it is
also anticipated that extensive, costly upgrading of
utility distribution systems for housing units would be
required to meet a variety of State and local standards
before utility companies would accept maintenance
responsibility. [Ref. 3:pg 3-47]
b. Effect on Tenants
The obvious effect that full utility payment has
on military housing tenants is that tenants will be aware of
their utility usage on a monthly basis. This fact alone
should stimulate a reduction in utility usage as pointed out
at the beginning of this chapter.
The military service member would now have to
assess whether government quarters or rental housing is the
financially prudent choice. The choices are: living in
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government quarters, receiving no BAQ and VHA, receiving a
utility allowance and paying a monthly utility bill or living
in rental housing, receiving BAQ and VHA but paying all
monthly rental and utility bills. This choice now makes it
more difficult for utility wasters. They will financially
suffer under either choice unless they modify their utility
use. For conservation minded military members, this would be
further incentive to live in government quarters. This choice
would financially benefit the military member because he pays
less for his monthly utility bill than he receives in his
monthly utility allowance.
4 . Pros and Cons
a . Pros
As previously mentioned, the greatest benefit from
full utility payment is the direct economic incentive tenants
have to reduce utility consumption. As the tenant modifies
his utility use, his utility bill is directly reduced and he
can purchase other goods with the money he would have spent on
utilities.
The remaining advantages all apply to the landlord
(government) . The first three advantages for the landlord
involve utility cost decreases due to adjustments in utility
allowances and education. More specifically, the government
could lower the utility allowance for each tenant as building
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efficiency improves. This would lower the monthly government
utility costs.
In addition, now that a utility allowance is
provided to each tenant, the government's utility costs do not
vary with the tenant's consumption. The tenant can over
consume utilities as much as he wants, as long as he pays for
the utilities.
The third advantage is that this alternative does
not require any substantial government educational effort.
Once an allowance is provided to the tenant, he is free to
choose whatever lifestyle is within his financial means. The
financially prudent utility consumer will realize that
modifying his utility usage has economic benefits and he will
implement the cheapest and most portable conservation
measures. If the government spent money on an educational
conservation program aimed at persuading tenants to reduce
utility consumption, they would not receive any financial
benefit. The government's utility cost is independent of the
tenant's utility usage.
The final advantage involves the Housing
Administration. Providing a utility allowance to each housing
tenant would remove military housing utility funding from the
Housing Administration and give it to the tenants. In effect,
Housing would lose the single pot of money they currently
receive from Congress and would have to collect the money from
individual tenants. This would encourage the Housing
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Administration to strive for 100 percent occupancy in
government quarters to ensure that fixed utility costs, costs
occurring regardless of utility use, and recurring housing
overhead costs were effectively covered each month. The
American taxpayer benefits in this case. By encouraging 100
percent occupancy of government quarters, Congress can reduce
BAQ and VHA appropriations. Fewer military members would have
the option of choosing rental housing over government
quarters.
b . Cons
The three disadvantages of full utility payments
are fairly minor relative to the potential benefits. One
disadvantage is that another military pay allowance would have
to be authorized by Congress. If Congress was serious in its
attempt to control DoD utility costs this would seem to be a
small price to pay. Implementing and distributing utility
allowances would be no more complex than the existing BAQ and
VHA allowances.
The second disadvantage is the need for an
accounting system to bill and collect monthly utility costs.
The actual accounting procedures are rather straight forward.
The down side is the need for an increased Housing
Administration staff to handle the new accounting
responsibilities.
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The last disadvantage, from the Housing
Administration's viewpoint, is Housing's loss of control over
utility funding. Housing could only pay its utility costs by
collecting money from each tenant. From the perspective of
the taxpayer, this is as an advantage, as described
previously.
D. ALTERNATIVE III: METER WITH FEEDBACK ONLY
1. Description
This alternative emphasizes the principle of
consumption data feedback as a method to promote energy
conservation. In this instance the feedback provided to
each family is the amount of energy consumed by either the
family or a major portion of the family housing complex.
In the other instance it will be necessary to meter each
housing unit. In the latter case master meters will be
installed as reguired to record the total energy consumed
in a contiguous complex which may have anywhere from 2 to
500 units. In either situation, the meters would need to
be read periodically and statements sent to each
residence. The statement would show consumption for the
billing period and possibly a comparison with the previous
year's identical billing period. A norm would not be
used. The information could be presented not only in
energy consumption figures such as Kwh and Btu but also in
dollars. No bill would be sent for any energy consumed.
A supporting educational program would aid the resident in
the interpretation of the feedback and establish means to
conserve energy. [Ref. 3:pg 8-7]
2. Economic Analysis
a . Theory
Once again we find ourselves analyzing an
alternative with a failed market mechanism. The utility
purchaser (government) is not the same entity as the utility
consumer (military member) . Economically, metering with
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feedback only is the worst of the five alternatives for
encouraging utility conservation. In both its description and
analysis of this alternative, the Report to the Congress:
Military Housing Metering Test never mentioned any
consequences to military tenants that ignore the feedback and
continue to consume excess utilities. Punishment for over
consumption in any form is never mentioned. Consumption
modification occurs through an educational program.
Whether housing units are individually metered
with individual feedback or master metered with group effort
feedback, there is simply no economic incentive for tenants to
reduce utility consumption. The only conservation effort
metering with feedback provides is an educational program
designed to modify tenants' behavior based on guilt for over
consumption.
Clive Seligman and John Darley [Ref . 20] conducted
a residential energy consumption study in 1977 that provided
informational feedback only to 29 physically identical three-
bedroom homes. Their study indicated that a 10.5 percent
electricity reduction was achieved during the three week
feedback period. Seligman and Darley admit that by soliciting
volunteers to participate in their study they may have started
with a biased population sample. In line with predictions
derived from either cognitive dissonance theory or attribution
theory, participants probably developed attitudes favorable to
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conservation which helped to sustain the motivation to
conserve electricity during this three week study.
In the present study, the level of energy conservation
obtained was unrelated to the initial level of energy use.
This suggests that energy conservation campaigns need not
be aimed solely at the relatively higher energy consumers;
lower users are also capable of further conservation. But
this finding also may be a result of the particular nature
of the feedback, which was organized in terms of
deviations from the person's own past energy usage;
moderate energy users were as affected by this kind of
feedback as were high users. High-energy consumers might
be more affected by feedback that promoted comparisons
with other users.
One of the most urgent questions that arise concerning
consumption feedback is its effectiveness over time. For
practical application of the feedback technique, its
efficacy over long periods of time would need to be
demonstrated. [Ref. 20:pg 367]
Without using some form of utility norm, Seligman
and Darley raise three interesting questions. First, what
sort of yardstick would be used for comparison purposes? If
each tenant's previous years consumption is used as the
conservation reference point, then weather differences would
cause a great deal of confusion. If last winter was
particularly severe and this winter is quite mild, utility
comparisons may be quite difficult.
The second question Seligman and Darley raise is:
how much effort at conservation is considered good? Their
study showed that low energy consumers as well as the high
energy consumers were capable of conserving utilities. With
continuous utility feedback, tenants may feel that they are
being asked to continually sacrifice a moderate lifestyle for
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a lifestyle of deprivation in order to show continued utility
savings during their residence in government quarters. This
obviously is not what the Secretary of Defense had in mind
when he insisted that the quality of life for military housing
and rental housing should be comparable. The Secretary of
Defense does not believe that military members and their
families should be subject to restrictions more severe than
those placed on private citizens nor that they should lose
basic entitlements under the guise of energy conservation.
[Ref. 3:pg ii]
The third question Seligman and Darley raise is
how effective a conservation program would be for an
uninspired housing population subjected to continuous
conservation propaganda? Seligman and Darley 's study lasted
only three weeks and involved volunteers. A captive audience
subjected to a continual barrage of utility conservation
propaganda may rapidly lose interest when they realize that
there are no economic or punitive consequences for poor
performance.
Winett, Kagel, Battalio and Winkler obtained some
startling results when they compared the electricity
consumption of three groups of Texas volunteers. Two groups
received a monetary reward based on their conservation effort
while the third group received utility usage feedback
information only.
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Overall, the results indicated that only the high
rebate system yielded substantial reductions in
electricity use during the entire experimental period. A
low rebate system was only marginally effective, and
weekly feedback and information were ineffective in
curtailing electricity use. In fact, information given
alone may increase use. [Ref. 14:pg 78]
b. Example
It is not possible to use a numerical example to
illustrate metering with feedback only. There is no provision
for a utility norm, utility allowance or payments by tenants
for utility consumption under this alternative. Tenants could
theoretically consume unlimited quantities of utilities for
which the government would pay.
3. Implementing
Metering with feedback only has no billing procedures
since there is no provision for tenants to pay utility bills.
Metering with feedback only would probably have a modest
impact on military tenants. Passive, low cost conservation
measures would probably be adopted (e.g., low flow shower
heads, fluorescent lighting, caulking or use of a microwave
oven rather than the gas stove) . Active conservation measures
requiring some tenant participation to realize utility savings
would be very difficult to obtain without either a reward or
punishment based on consumption behavior.
This system was attempted in a short term field trial
in family housing at Pensacola, Florida. A 5 to 6 percent
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savings in electricity was realized. This Energy Conservation
Advocacy Program included:
• Face-to-face coaching regarding energy saving methods and
practices
• Conservation advocacy by a person seen as expert and
concerned about the guality of the tenant's lives
• Active participation in the learning and change process by
all family members from school age up
• Identification with neighborhood and community
• Communication of community social norms regarding energy
consumption
• Group (neighborhood and community) energy consumption
feedback on a regular basis
The program was designed to cover one complete year.
It is repeated in the same format in succeeding years. This
program is a never ending educational process requiring face-
to-face contact between military housing residents and the
housing energy advocate.
An educational program would be beneficial for passive
conservation measures (engineering measures) . Tenants could
eventually resent active conservation measures requiring the
tenants' cooperation to modifying utility consumption
behavior. Repetitive reminders to conserve eventually lose
their appeal when the consumer has no economic incentive to
change his behavior. Relying on guilt to incentivise
conservation can only instill resentment and anger in the
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consumer since he has no idea how low his consumption should
be before the 'guilt-trip' is turned off.
4. Pros and Cons
a . Pros
The only advantage this alternative has over the
previous alternatives is that there is no cost to implement an
accounting system for billing and collecting monthly utility
payments.
Jb . Cons
Of the six disadvantages, the first three deal
with the tenants' perception of this alternative. First,
without a market mechanism, there is no economic incentive to
change the tenants' consumption pattern. Studies have showed
only limited success in utility reductions when tenants are
asked to sacrifice their lifestyle for no apparent economic
benefit. Second, without a utility measurement standard it is
very difficult to determine what level of utility conservation
is sufficient or conversely, inadequate. Third, with constant
exposure to utility conservation propaganda, a high level of
tenant enthusiasm and participation may be difficult to
sustain.
The next two disadvantages deal with the utility
conservation educational program. First, as with Alternative
I, the primary motivation for the educational effort is guilt.
Reliance on guilt to obtain utility reductions can only foster
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resentment and lack of interest in the conservation program.
Second, the educational program has an unlimited potential to
consume funding. Unlimited money could be thrown at the
educational program. As Seligman and Darley said,
"instrumenting feedback will be a costly process, and it is
necessary to know when that is cost effective [Ref. 20:pg
367] .»
The final disadvantage is that the entire utility
savings is generated from the educational program. When a
base faces financial cutbacks, educational and training
programs are usually the first to be cut. Any reduction in
the level of funding for the military housing utility
education and feedback program would be viewed by the tenants
as a lack of commitment to utility conservation by higher
authority.
E. ALTERNATIVE IV: BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENT
1. Description
Building and equipment improvement consists of two
parts. One involves altering the characteristics of all
DoD family housing buildings and the other provides for
the development of a new source of energy. The former
program involves three major retrofit opportunities. It
is proposed that the retrofitting concentrate on reducing
the requirement for space heating and cooling, which
represents 60 percent of the demand in a typical home.
Two projects, adding insulation throughout and installing
thermal blanketing on windows, would reduce the heat loss
or gain through the ceilings, walls, floors, and windows.
The third project would concentrate on reducing heating or
cooling loads by reducing air infiltration through
unsealed windows, doors, etc. Additional projects may
include the installation of dual element temperature
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limiting thermostats and insulation blankets on water
heaters, solar shading, duct insulation, etc. The latter
program provides for the conversion of electric or natural
gas DHW to solar heat in 50,000 southern units which would
save approximately 150,000 equivalent barrels of oil each
year. [Ref. 3:pg 8-11]
2. Economic Analysis
a . Theory
Building and equipment improvement is the third
example of a failed market mechanism for encouraging utility
conservation. Of the five alternatives analyzed, building and
equipment improvement is the only alternative that does not
attempt to modify the tenants' consumption behavior. The
savings in utility costs would be derived specifically from
engineering improvements in existing buildings.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fails to
point out in the Report to the Congress that building and
equipment improvements should be an integral part the other
four alternatives, not a separate alternative. Building and
equipment improvements are the landlords' responsibility;
modifying utility consumption is the tenants' responsibility.
An effective utility conservation program would incorporate
both landlord and tenant contributions toward utility cost
reductions.
Investments in building and equipment face major
obstacles. The tenant is not willing to improve property that
is not his own. The landlord is not willing to invest in
improvements that have a payback period greater than three or
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four years. DoD recognizes its responsibility for efficiency
improvements in military housing. The Energy Conservation
Investment Program (ECIP) only reguires a 6 year or less
payback period on building and eguipment improvements. Once
an improvement is approved and funded by DoD, the lack of
accurate metering prohibits verification or analysis of the
resulting energy savings. The lack of accurate metering makes
it difficult to evaluate efficiency improvements. In
addition, energy wasters may negate the utility savings in
master metered housing.
As an example, the 15 energy conservation measures
listed below have been implemented at La Mesa Village between
1975 and 1992.
TABLE 5-3
ENERGY CONSERVATION MEASURES AT LA MESA VILLAGE
Install fluorescent lights
Jan 1992 $349,414
Install electronic ignition to gas heating furnaces
Oct 1991 $140,887
Replace casement windows with double pane windows in Wherry
housing
Aug 1986 $1,080,514
Install water heater insulation jackets
Sep 1985
Install hot water control valves on 250 gallon hot water tanks
•69 housing
Jun 1985




Insulate the walls during siding repair project in '65 housing
Sep 1983
Install night set-back thermostats
Mar 1984




Install forced air heating systems in Wherry housing
Jan 1979
Replace hot and cold water piping in Wherry housing
May 1978
Install water saving showerheads
Sep 1977
Repair forced air heating systems in Capehart housing
Apr 1976
Replace ceiling insulation in Wherry housing
Oct 1975
Specific savings due to each energy improvement
cannot be measured or identified. The Energy Audit Report
from NEESA documents a 19.15 percent reduction in electricity
and natural gas consumption from 1975 to 1985 for La Mesa
Village, based on 1975 utility consumption rates. The
specific contributions of energy conservation measures
completed during this period cannot be evaluated.
From 1985 through 1991, La Mesa Village has
realized an averaged total 6.17 percent reduction in
electricity and natural gas consumption based on 1985 utility
consumption rates. The cumulative 1985 utility baseline is
847,060 Mbtu for La Mesa Village for the period 1985 to 1991.
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794 ,737 MBtu were actually consumed during that period.
Approximately 80 percent of La Mesa Village utilities are
natural gas. The remaining 20 percent is electricity. This
would suggest that in seven years La Mesa Village has saved
52,323 MBtu of energy over its 1985 energy baseline. This
equates to approximately £524,282 over seven years. The lack
of individual metering does not allow these savings to be
discounted in any way. It is impossible to distribute these
savings among the energy conservation programs and thereby
assign specific savings to each year.
(52,323 MBtu)(80 percent)! $ 6 ' 83 ]=$285, 893
(52,323 MBtu)(20 percent)! i^£ \/ $77 75 \ = $238, 389K A * \ 3.413 MBtuj\ Mwhr j
The three most recent conservation measures at La
Mesa Village cost $1,570,815. This implies that three times
more money has been spent on energy improvements than has been
received in reduced operating costs.
Separate metering of housing units in the rental
market removes the direct incentive for landlords to improve
their buildings and equipment. The utility bill is passed on
to the tenant (though these may be an indirect effect if
landlords' can increase rents). In military housing with a
utility allowance (Alternative II) , utility improvements would
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lower utility allowances, providing a direct incentive to the
landlord to improve the utility efficiency of military
dwellings. With no individual meters and landlord utility
payment, savings from landlord utility improvements must be
large enough to outweigh the energy wasters efforts.
Building and equipment improvement is a half-
measure in the utility conservation program. Counihan and
Nemtzow recognized that both landlords and tenants need to
participate in utility conservation in master metered
dwellings.
Tenants control much of the pattern of energy use,
while landlords establish the efficiency of consumption.
Both parties therefore affect the quantity of total use,
but only one party (landlord) pays the utility bill. [Ref
.
22:pg 1104]
If the landlord takes responsibility for building
and equipment improvements in a master-metered dwelling, there
is no economic incentive for the tenant to conserve. Utility
consumption may actually increase if tenants rationalize that
greater utility efficiency allows a more luxurious lifestyle.
3. Pros and Cons
a . Pros
The first advantage of building and equipment
improvements is this alternative's relatively low initial cost
relative to the other four alternatives. This is the only
alternative not requiring extensive costs for metering,
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education and feedback, making this alternative initially the
cheapest alternative.
The second advantage of building and equipment
improvement is that the landlord's improvements are totally
independent of the tenant's utility consumption behavior. The
justification for the building and equipment improvements is
based on engineering estimates of the estimated savings, not
on tenant participation in a utility conservation effort.
b . Cons
The first disadvantage is that this alternative is
only half of a utility conservation program involving only the
landlord. This alternative should be implemented on the part
of the landlord in conjunction with one of the other four
alternatives.
Second, Because this alternative involves only the
landlord, there is no incentive for tenant utility reductions.
Utility improvements may incentivise the tenant to waste
utilities since his wasteful consumption would be offset by
the improved utility efficiency.
The third disadvantage is that this alternative
has unlimited cost potential for building and equipment
efficiency improvements. DoD currently requires an ECIP of
less than 6 years for project approval, but there are an
unlimited number of utility improvement projects. DoD could
spend millions of dollars on utility improvements each year.
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Without accurate metering, there is no post construction
evaluation of the actual savings.
F. ALTERNATIVE V: METER, BILL FOR EXCESS CONSUMPTION, WITH
REWARD FOR CONSERVATION
1. Description
Billing tenants for excess utilities consumed and
rewarding those tenants who conserve utilities is Option B of
Alternative I proposed in the Report to the Congress: Family
Housing Metering Test.
[This alternative] is identical to [Alternative I:
Metering and Billing of Excess Consumption] except that
the funds received from excess consumers of energy are not
necessarily retained in the FHMA (D) . These funds as well
as funds originally budgeted for utilities are available
for redistribution to the residents who conserve the most
energy. [Ref. 3:pg 8-3]
For a more eguitable reward system this thesis
proposes redistributing 25 percent of the savings realized by
the tenants' conservation effort back to those tenants whose
utility consumption is below their norm. This concept will be
illustrated with a numerical example in V.F 2.b.
2. Economic Analysis
a . Theory
This alternative is punitive for the expected 15
percent of the tenants consuming utilities in excess of their
norm allowance. It also has an incentive for tenants to
consume below their norm allowance and to continue or increase
their utility conservation effort. This system is very
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similar to Alternative II, Meter with Full Payment, in that
every tenant has a direct economic incentive to reduce utility
use through an operating market mechanism.
This alternative provides a smaller economic
incentive for utility conservation than Alternative II. It
replaces the allowance in Alternative II with a 25 percent
rebate for each tenant consuming less than the utility norm.
The punitive costs are also smaller under this alternative
than Alternative II because once again the costs for excess
utility consumption are marginal costs. The tenant in excess
of his norm sees a possible monthly utility bill of $10 - $30.
This is a very small monthly charge if a tenant does not wish
to modify his lifestyle. Also, for a tenant below his norm,
the few marginal dollars (rebate) which is the difference
between a tenant's norm and his actual utility usage may not
be much of an incentive to continue conserving utilities.
On the margin, the punitive costs of this
alternative and Alternative II are the same. The consumer
pays the full cost of the consumption in excess of the utility
norm. This alternative is analyzed because of its possible
attractiveness to Congress. Congress may not be willing to
implement a utility allowance for military members in the face
of a growing national deficit. Congress may also be enticed
into adopting this alternative because of the 75 percent
government sharing arrangement with tenants below the norm.
Congress must appropriate 100 percent of the funds for
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military utility allowances under Alternative II with the
military member keeping all savings. Under this alternative,
the government is guaranteed a reduced utility bill assuming
85 percent of the tenants consume below their norm. This
alternative does provide a limited direct economic incentive
to both tenants and landlord to implement conservation
measures, as in Alternative II. However, the financial
incentives to adopt this alternative are greater for the
government since it receives a 75 percent rebate on each
utility dollar saved.
Several studies, Winett, Kagel, Battalio, and
Winkler [Ref. 14], Walker [Ref. 15], Craig and McCann [Ref.
17], Slavin, Wodarski, and Blackburn [Ref. 16], and Counihan
and Nemtzow [Ref. 22] suggest that any form of economic
incentive for the reduction of utilities is better than no
incentive at all. In this case, an economic incentive is




Appendix D has a detailed example of a monthly
utility bill for La Mesa Village. This example assumes that
La Mesa Village would have a $147,500.38 monthly utility bill
if each tenant consumed exactly his utility allowance. The
example assumes that 15 percent of the La Mesa Village
population saves $2,205.38 by consuming 10 percent below their
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utility norm. It also assumes that 70 percent of the La Mesa
Village population saves $6,199.32 by consuming 6 percent
below their utility norm. In addition, 10 percent of the La
Mesa Village population costs an additional $889.83 by
consuming 6 percent above their utility norm. Finally, 5
percent of the La Mesa Village population costs $1,083.50 by
consuming 15 percent above their utility norm.
After paying the monthly utility bill of
$141,069.01, the Housing Administration distributes $1,667.25
to the 710 tenants who consumed less than their norm for the
month. The government keeps $4,768.61 as its portion of the
monthly utility savings. In this particular example,
individual tenants would receive a monthly utility rebate from
$1.60 up to $4.46 depending on the size of the individual's
conserved utilities.
If the entire La Mesa Village population consumed
below their monthly norm, the individual rebates would
increase. For example, assume that 30 percent of the La Mesa
Village population saves $4,417.84 by consuming 10 percent
below their utility norm. The remaining 70 percent of the La
Mesa Village population saves $6,199.32 by consuming 6 percent
below their utility norm. With these figures, the Housing
Administration would have to pay a monthly utility bill of
$136,883.22 and have $2,654.29 available for distribution to
all 835 tenants. The individual tenant utility rebates would
range from $2.12 up to $5.89 for the month with the rebate
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being directly proportional to the tenant's conserved
utilities. The more the entire housing population saves, the
more each tenant would receive in their monthly utility
rebate.
If the incentive system proposed by Option B of
the Report to the Congress is used and the funds collected for
excess utility consumption are distributed to the tenants
consuming below their norm, the individual tenant utility
rebates in the first example above jump up to the incredible
range of $4.11 up to $11.43 for the month. This introduces an
unusual incentive system. Each tenant wants to consume below
his own norm to be included in the monthly utility rebate.
However, each tenant wants to encourage his neighbor to
consume more than his norm so that the conserving tenant's
monthly utility rebate increases. For this reason, this
thesis proposes that only the portion of the saved monthly
utility costs be redistributed to the conserving tenants and
not the funds collected from tenants that consume above their
norm.
While this alternative increases the incentive to
conserve, it is not clear that it corrects the problems of the
25 percent rebate. There is no direct relation between the
tenant's conservation effort and his rebate payment because
the amount of his payment depends on the other tenants'
actions. In addition, the tenant does not know in advance how
many tenants are going to over-consume so that he does not
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have information necessary to make trade-offs on the margin
based on accurate cost information.
3. Implementation
a. Billing
The billing system for this alternative would be
only slightly more complicated than Alternative I. This
alternative would involve collecting money from tenants who
consume above their monthly norm and redistributing funds to
tenants who consumed below their monthly norm. Since the
amount of the monthly rebates are fairly small, it might be
better to simply report the accumulated monthly rebate on the
utility usage feedback statement. When the tenant vacates La
Mesa Village, one of the checkout procedures would be the
payment of the accumulated utility monthly rebate. This way,
the Housing Administration would not have to process several
small monthly checks. They would only process one check for
$50 to $100 for each tenant at checkout.
b. Effect on Tenants
All tenants, whether consuming above or below
their norm, would have an incentive to further reduce utility
consumption. Those tenants consuming above their norm may
find the penalty payment tolerable and not much of an
incentive to reduce their utility consumption. Those tenants
consuming below their norm may find the rebate insufficient to
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entice further conservation efforts. Tenant consumption
behavior may not be modified by this alternative.
This alternative would have little impact on
morale due to the small amount of money involved each month.
Those tenants who have higher alternative uses for their money
will conserve utilities and receive a substantial check when
they vacate government quarters. Those tenants who value the
utilities will continue to consume above their norm and pay
their small monthly utility bill.
4 . Pros and Cons
a . Pros
The first advantage this alternative has over
Alternative I is that, like Alternative II, both the tenants
(both over and under consumers) and the landlord have a direct
economic incentive for conserving utilities. Tenants
consuming below their norm are incentivised to continue
conserving by a 25 percent utility rebate. Tenants consuming
above their norm are incentivised to reduce their consumption
by a utility bill. The landlord is incentivised to implement
utility conservation measures by retaining 75 percent of the
realized utility savings.
The advantage this system has over Alternative II
is that another allowance system is not necessary. The
Housing Administration retains control of utility funding.
Utilities consumed in excess of tenant's norms are paid for by
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tenants and realized savings are shared with tenants who
consume below their norm. This alternative guarantees that
the government will never pay more than its annual budget in
utility bills. It should consistently realize some savings
each month.
b . Cons
The disadvantage of this alternative is that the
economic incentives for the tenants, both under and over
consumers, are very small (although they are the same on the
margin as Alternative II for over consumption) . Such small
economic incentives may not be sufficient to modify tenant's
consumption behavior.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
According to Table 1 in the Report to the Congress, the
five alternatives are ranked from highest recommendation to
lowest recommendation based on net annual savings or cost.
Net Annual Savings/Cost
Alt 4: Building and Equipment Improvement $35,527,000 Sav
Alt 5: Meter / Tradable Permits $11,571,000 Cost
Alt 2: Meter / Full Payment $11,657,000 Cost
Alt 3: Meter / Feedback Only $23,200,000 Cost
Alt 1: Meter / Bill For Excess $42,320,000 Cost
Based on the analysis in this thesis, the five
alternatives are ranked as follows:
INCENTIVES
UNDER NORM OVER NORM LANDLORD
Alt 2: Meter/ Full Payment XXX
Alt 5: Meter/ Tradable Permits XXX
Alt 1: Meter/ Bill For Excess X X
Alt 3: Meter/ Feedback Only X
Alt 4: Building/Equipment Imp X
Only Alternatives II and V provide an economic incentive
for all tenants to conserve utilities. Alternative I only
provides an incentive for over consumers to conserve but
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provides no incentive for the under consumer to continue or
reduce utility consumption. Alternative III and IV are
clearly the worst two alternatives from the tenant's
perspective. Neither provides any incentive for the tenants
to reduce their utility consumption.
Alternative IV has the unique distinction of only
involving the landlord in the utility conservation program.
The other four alternatives could each be implemented along
with Alternative IV. This would be a better conservation
program than Alternative IV by itself.
A general conclusion highlighted by this thesis is the
extreme difficulty of assessing the effectiveness or
efficiency of conservation measures without accurate metering
data. If DoD is serious about reducing its utility costs, the
first place to start would be identifying utility wasting
facilities and personnel.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recommendation Number 1
To comply with the Congressional intent of reducing
utility consumption in military family housing units, a full
utility conservation program should be implemented. DoD
should continue to effect building and equipment improvements.
This is the landlords' responsibility toward utility
conservation. Alternative II or V should also be implemented
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to place tenant utility conservation responsibilities with
military families living in government quarters.
2 . Recommendation Number 2
DoD should meter as many of its facilities as is
economically feasible. This accurately measures utilities
consumed and helps assess post construction energy
improvements. Accurate utility meter readings will allow DoD
to identify utility losses in transmission lines and piping as
well as identifying utility wasting facilities and personnel.
3. Recommendation Number 3
DoD should initiate a long-term study involving tenant
utility consumption modification. There currently is no good
literature or data on actual savings in metered housing. DoD
should pick a location with more than 300 units, meter them
and initiate one of the four alternatives designed to modify
tenant consumption behavior. By metering one housing site,
DoD could systematically implement all five alternatives and
obtain numerical data on the utility savings over a long
period of time. Comparing the test results from each of the
alternatives could help establish a DoD wide utility
conservation policy.
4. Further Study
A suggested follow on study to this thesis would
collect data from one Naval base to evaluate the effectiveness
of the current Navy utility conservation program. Analyzing
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utility conservation at a Naval base and the actual utility
savings could possibly show that implementing Alternative IV:










































In the Denver area, metering reduced total annual water
use by about 20 percent. Over a 3-year period, water use in
metered homes averaged about 453 gallons per day. Water use
in flat-rate homes (master metered) averaged about 566 gallons
per day. [Ref. 19:pg 1-3]
Samuel Nelson found that the average electricity savings
was about 20 percent after switching from master metering to
individual metering. In 28 studies conducted from 1969 to
1976, he found that savings were smaller when electricity was
also used for heating than when it was only used for lights,
appliances and possible cooling. [Ref. 18:pg 3]
Clive Seligman and John Darley studied electrical use in
29 physically identical three-bedroom homes. Before feedback
began, the feedback and control groups consumed electricity at
approximately equal rates. During the feedback period, the
feedback group used 10.5 percent less electricity. [Ref. 20:pg
363]
Winett, Kagel, Battalio, and Winkler studied 129 volunteer
single family residential households in Texas. They were
broken into 3 control groups. Participants were monetarily
rewarded for lowering electricity use. One group received a
240 percent rebate for changes in electricity use, another
group received a 50 percent rebate and the final group
received no rebate. Only the high rebate group significantly
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curtailed electricity use. It decreased by about 12 percent
over the course of the study. [Ref. 14:pg 73]
Samuel Craig and John McCann collected data from 700 New
York Metropolitan area residents using a questionnaire. 18
percent of the respondents lived in master metered dwellings.
The remaining 82 percent lived in single-metered dwellings.
Craig and McCann concluded that individuals living in master-
metered dwellings consume on the average 35 percent more
electricity than individuals living in comparable single-
metered dwellings. The main reason for the higher consumption
appears to be the lack of a direct incentive to conserve
electricity. [Ref. 17:pg 162]
Counihan and Nemtzow compared three studies and found that
savings varied considerably, reflecting differences not only
in methodology of each study but in the fuel sources and end
use observed in each study. A 1975 study determined that
individually metered residences use 26 percent less
electricity than master metered ones. The savings reported by
electric utility companies, released in a 1977 study, averaged
18 percent with individual metering. A third study, in 1979,
found that separate metering saved 15 - 20 percent for
electricity; its findings for natural gas ranged from a 7
percent savings to an 8 percent loss. [Ref. 22:pg 1114-1115]
Ritschard and Dickey found building construction so poor
for low income public housing that any form of energy
conservation measure reduced previous energy consumption
90
levels from 14.5 percent to a maximum of 50 percent in cold
climates like Minnesota. [Ref. 24]
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APPENDIX C
UTILITY NORM CALCULATION FOR LA MESA VILLAGE
Electricity (Mwhr)
Date Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
1991 559 505 493 542 461 422
1990 547 555 573 492 467 487
1989 628 566 608 500 491 524
1988 638 604 575 573 501 502
1987 611 602 597 597 597 531
1986 569 551 536 514 556 508
1985 552 575 615 530 531 485
Date Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
1991 535 455 552 505 566 579 6,174
1990 350 402 458 419 419 481 5,650
1989 434 480 558 521 537 619 6,466
1988 482 490 506 571 559 590 6,591
1987 504 526 537 541 582 573 6,798
1986 485 489 527 507 626 602 6,470
1985 436 515 516 505 619 644 6,523
The annual average electricity consumption in La Mesa
Village is 21,782 MBtu or 6,382 Mwhr. Residential households
consume on the average between 400 and 600 Kwhr
per month. Using the following breakdown for 2, 3 and 4
bedroom dwellings at La Mesa Village accounts for 6,359 Mwhr
annually.
Units Monthly Kwhr Annual Mwhr
2 Bedroom Units 72 475 410
3 Bedroom Units 681 605 4,944




Date Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
1991 11425 7541 12465 10267 9194 7104
1990 10489 13887 7991 8566 6322 5546
1989 13755 12075 9503 6021 6122 6081
1988 11752 10023 8567 7545 6731 5532
1987 13464 8852 9133 9133 9022 5842
1986 8799 9721 7306 7355 7458 5250
1985 10907 10710 10128 7684 7397 4846
Date Jul Auq Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
1991 7117 4436 4289 4516 7325 10214 95,,893
1990 3589 3691 4124 4331 4331 7541 80,,408
1989 3939 4500 5476 4722 6948 9795 88,,937
1988 4745 3988 4566 5795 6860 9586 85,,690
1987 4993 4534 4502 4290 5346 6019 85,,130
1986 4713 4364 4935 5100 4578 4578 74,,157
1985 3790 4477 4392 4888 9029 11171 89,,419
The annual average natural gas consumption in La Mesa
Village is 85,662 MBtu. Residential households consume on the
average between 100 and 400 KBtu per day. Using the following
breakdown for 2, 3 and 4 bedroom dwellings at La Mesa Village
accounts for 84,653 MBtu annually.
Units KBtu/day KBtu/month Annual MBtu
2 Bedroom Units 72 230 6900 5,961
3 Bedroom Units 681 265 7950 64,967




Date Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
1992 6918 6122 6831 7055 8736 8918
1991 6132 5547 5832 6480 7151 6976
1990 6265 5592 6576 6600 7191 6818
1989 7111 6030 6722 6169 7391 6907
Date Jul Auq Sep Oct NOV Dec Total
1992 10921
1991 8914 9496 10349 8739 6292 6744 88,652
1990 8407 9558 8589 8796 7196 6539 88, 127
1989 8097 8520 7832 9803 6830 5713 87, 125
The annual water consumption in La Mesa Village is 87,968
Kgallons. Taking a daily population weighted average for La
Mesa Village yields a daily population of 2892 people. This
equates to a daily water consumption of 83.3 gallons per
person. For ease of calculation, 80 gallons per person per
day will be used as the water norm.
/ 87,96 8,000 Gal \l Year \l Day W 83.3 Gal \
\ Year A 365 Days)\ 289 2 persons} \ person f
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APPENDIX D
EXAMPLE MONTHLY UTILITY BILL
La Mesa Village contains 878 family dwellings including
two, three and four bedroom units. This example assumes that
95.09 percent of the housing units are occupied.
Units Available Filled
2 Bedrooms 72 68
3 Bedrooms 681 648
4 Bedrooms 125 119
TOTAL 878 835
The norms established in Appendix C will be used in this
example. The utility rates are, $0.064/KWhr (electricity),
$0.014/KBtu (gas) and $0. 003/Gallon (Water).
The Code used in this example designates the number of
people living in the unit. Code 1 means a military member and
spouse. Code 2 means a military member, spouse and one child.
Code 3 means a military member, spouse and two children. Code
8 means a military member, spouse and seven children.
Using the norms of Appendix C, the previously established
utility norms and the previously defined housing codes a
typical La Mesa Village monthly utility bill is as follows:
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Code Units Elec Gas Water
1 2B 68 $ 2,067.20 $ 6,568.80 $ 979.20
3B 80 $ 3,097.60 $ 8,904.00 $1,152.00
2 3B 260 $10,067.20 $28,938.00 $5,616.00
3 3B 291 $11,267.52 $32,388.30 $8,380.80
4 3B 17 $ 658.24 $ 1,892.10 $ 612.00
4B 86 $ 3,687.68 $11,016.60 $3,096.00 Norm
5 4B 29 $ 1,243.52 $ 3,714.90 $1,252.80 Monthly
6 4B 3 $ 128.64 $ 384.30 $ 151.20 Billing
8 4B 1 $ 42.88 $ 128.10 $ 64.80
TOTAL 835 $32,260.48 $93,935.10 $21,304.80 $147,500.38
Assuming that 15 percent of the La Mesa Village population
(125) consumes 10 percent below their norm, the government
would save $2,205.38 in monthly utility costs. Assuming 70
percent of the La Mesa Village population (585) consumes 6
percent below their norm, the government would save $6,199.32
in monthly utility costs. 10 percent of the La Mesa Village
population (84) is assumed to consume 6 percent above their
norm, resulting in an $889.83 penalty payment. Five percent
of the La Mesa Village population (41) is assumed to consume
15 percent above their norm, resulting in a $1,083.50 penalty
payment.
15% of Population Under Norm
Code Units 10% Below Subtotal
1 2B 10 $14.14 $141.40
3B 12 $16.44 $197.30
2 3B 39 $17.16 $669.32
3 3B 44 $17.88 $786.81
4 3B 3 $18.60 $ 55.81
4B 13 $20.70 $269.07
5 4B 4 $21.42 $ 85.67
6 4B $22.14 $ 0.00
8 4B $23.58 $ 0.00
TOTAL 125 $2,205.38
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10% of Population Above Norm
Code Units 6% Above Subtotal
1 2B 7 $ 8.48 $ 59.39
3B 8 $ 9.87 $ 78.92
2 3B 26 $10.30 $267.73
3 3B 29 $10.73 $311.15
4 3B 2 $11.16 $ 22.32
4B 9 $12.42 $111.77
5 4B 3 $12.85 $ 38.55
6 4B $13.28 $ 0.00
8 4B $14.15 $ 0.00
TOTAL 84 $889.83
5% of Population Above Norm
Code Units 15% Above Subtotal
1 2B 3 $21.21 $ 63.63
3B 4 $24.66 $ 98.65
2 3B 13 $25.74 $334.66
3 3B 15 $26.82 $402.35
4 3B 1 $27.90 $ 27.90
4B 4 $31.05 $124.19
5 4B 1 $32.13 $ 32.13
6 4B $33.21 $ 0.00
8 4B $35.37 $ 0.00
TOTAL 41 $1,083.50
SCENARIO 1: REBATE INCLUDES PENALTY PAYMENT
Under the scenario the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense proposed, a utility bill of $141,069.01 would be paid
each month with the government receiving $2,356.86 in savings.
710 residents would receive $4,074.51 in total disbursements
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from the utility rebates, with individual rebates between













Payments to tenants under their norm:
[Ind Energy sav] / [Tot Sav] * [Cost + (.25)*Sav]
As an example, a code 3 family that is 10 percent below
their norm saved the government $17.88 on this month's utility




(Tot Sav) v '
$17 .88















% Under 6% Under 10% Under 6% Under
$ 6.85 $4.11 $ 68.55 $ 197.42
$ 7.97 $4.78 $ 95.65 $ 267.82
$ 8.32 $4.99 $324.48 $ 908. 54
$ 8.67 $5.20 $381.44 $1 r 061.09
$ 9.02 $5.41 $ 27.05 $ 64.93
$10.03 $6.02 $130.44 $ 361.23
$10.38 $6.23 $ 41.53 $ 124.60
$10.73 $6.44 $ 0.00 $ 12.88
$11.43 $6.86 $ 0.00 $ 6.86
$1, 069. 14 $3 , 005.36
$4 , 074.51
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SCENARIO 2: ALL HOUSING TENANTS BELOW THEIR NORM
This scenario assumes all 835 military tenants at La Mesa
Village consume below their norm for the month. Under this
scenario, 30 percent of the population average 10 percent
below their norm. The remaining 70 percent of the population
averages 6 percent below their norm. This would provide the
government a monthly utility savings of $10,617.16. Twenty-
five percent would be distributed to the 835 tenants. Under
this scenario, the individual rebates drop to between $2.12
and $5.89 for a total disbursement of $2,654.29. There is no
income from any penalty payments.
This would seem to suggest that each tenant would
encourage his neighbor to consume above his norm so that the
tenant consuming below his norm could profit from both the
penalty payment and the 2 5 percent rebate from the actual











Utility Bill : $136,883.22
Payments to tenants under their norm:
[Ind Energy sav] / [Tot Sav] * [Cost + (.25)*Sav]
A code 3 family that is 10 percent below their norm saves
the government $17.88 on this months utility bill. The code
3 resident would receive $4.47 for this months utility rebate,
almost half what he received under scenario 1.
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(Ind Sa v)
*(Cost+0 _ 2 5*Sav)=Rebat((Tot Sav) K '
$17 .88
$4417 .84+$6199 .32 [($0.00+$0.0 0) + 0.2 5*($4 417 .84 +$6 19 9 .3 2)] = $4
Individual rebates Total rebates
Code 10% Under 6% Under 10% Under 6% Under
1 2B $3.54 $2.12 $ 70.70 $101.81
3B $4.11 $2.47 $ 98.65 $138.11
2 3B $4.29 $2.57 $334.66 $468.52
3 3B $4.47 $2.68 $388.93 $547.19
4 3B $4.65 $2.79 $ 23.25 $ 33.48
4B $5.17 $3. 10 $134.54 $186.28
5 4B $5.35 $3.21 $ 48.19 $ 64.25
6 4B $5.53 $3.32 $ 5.53 $ 6.64





SCENARIO 3: REBATE ONLY 2 5 PERCENT OF ACTUAL SAVINGS
This analysis proposes to use the simple method of
allocating rebates based on 25 percent of the actual utility
savings to tenants consuming below their norm. With the same
conditions as in Scenario 1, the penalty payment is removed
from the rebate eguation. The individual rebates drop to
between $1.60 and $4.46 with a total disbursement of














Payments to tenants under their norm:
[Ind Energy sav] / [Tot Sav] * [(.25)*Sav]
A code 3 family that is 10 percent below their norm has
saved the government $17.88 on this months utility bill. The
code 3 resident would receive $3.38 for this months utility
rebate.
(Ind SaV) 2S ^S RebatQ
(Tot Sav) K '
$17 .88
$2205.38+$6199 .32 [0.25*($147 50 0.3 8-$14114 2.23)] = $3 .38
Individual rebates Total rebates
Code 10% Under 6% Und
1 2B $2.67 $1.60
3B $3.11 $1.87
2 3B $3.25 $1.95
3 3B $3.38 $2.03
4 3B $3.52 $2.11
4B $3.91 $2.35
5 4B $4.05 $2.43
6 4B $4.19 $2.51




























Scenario 3 shows that when 15 percent of the La Mesa
Village population consumes above their norm, the remaining 85
percent of the tenants receive utility rebates ranging from
$1.60 up to $4.46. If all the La Mesa Village tenants consume
below their norm, the individual utility rebates increase to
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between $2.12 and $5.89. This is a positive incentive for all




• BAQ - Basic Allowance for Quarters, an allowance for
monthly rent and utilities provided to military members
renting housing in the civilian community.
• BAS - Basic Allowance for Subsistence, an allowance
provided to all military members to defray the cost of
monthly food bills.
• CNET - Chief of Naval Education and Training
• DoD - Department of Defense
• ECIP - Energy Conservation Investment Program, DoD ' s
engineering program which analyzes the investment
potential for energy conservation programs based on a
payback period of 6 years or less.
• Energy Audit Report - A monthly energy report for each
Naval Activity which monitors electricity and gas
consumption.
•FY - Fiscal Year, beginning 1 October each year.
• Individual metering - Each dwelling has its own meter for
electricity, gas and water.
• Kgal - Kilo gallons, 1000 gallons.
• Kwhr - Kilowatt-hours, 1000 watt-hours (a measure of
electrical power consumption)
.
• Market Mechanism -, An economic condition where price
determines quantity consumed by the purchaser.
• Master metering - One set of meters monitors the total
consumption of utilities for a housing complex.
• MBtu - Mega British Thermal Units, the term for the
measure of heat generated by natural gas, in units of one
million British Thermal Units.
• NAVFACENGCOM - Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the
Naval Command responsible for Naval real estate
management, energy conservation programs and all Naval
military housing facilities.
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• Norm - A set criteria level for utility consumption
against which tenant consumption is compared.
• OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Arab
countries which export oil.
• Potable - Drinkable water.
• RUBS - Resident Utility Billing System, a billing system
for submetered dwellings to allocate utility costs to
residents based on dwelling square footage.
• Submetering - More than one dwelling on a utility meter
but less than all dwellings in the housing complex.
• Utilities - Electricity, oil, gas and water consumed on
a daily basis by residents in family housing units.
• VHA - Variable Housing Allowance, a supplemental allowance
for BAQ to compensate military members for the local cost
of living from city to city.
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Part of the reason is that individuals in master-metered
dwellings do not have a direct economic incentive to
conserve energy. A sample of master-metered and single-
metered individuals is examined to provide some guidance
in formulating appeals to achieve energy
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conservation. Through a New York survey of single-
metered and master-metered dwellings, the authors
concluded that economic incentives are responsible for
encouraging better energy conservation practices in
single-metered dwellings.
Crossley, D. , 1983: IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO THE
SUCCESS OF CONSUMER ENERGY CONSERVATION POLICIES, Energy .
Vol. 8, No. 7. Barriers to energy conservation inhibit or
retard changes in current inefficient patterns of energy
use. This paper reports the results of a project which
identified barriers to energy conservation by individual
households. The focus was specifically on non-technical
barriers; that is, social, institutional and economic
factors which prevent people from increasing the
efficiency with which they use energy. Barriers were
identified by content analysis of interviews with
householders; these barriers were therefore those that
were seen as being important from the perspective of the
householder. Six categories of barriers were identified
on the basis of the circumstances out of which the
barriers arose. Distributed among these six categories
were 25 different types of barriers. Householders'
responses towards energy conservation policy proposals
were also assessed. Favorable evaluation of a policy
proposal did not necessarily lead to an intention to adopt
an energy-conserving practice, presumably because of the
existence of barriers to energy conservation. Energy
policy makers should examine in detail barriers to energy
conservation of the types identified in this paper, and
then develop appropriate policy mechanisms to overcome
these barriers.
Department of the Navy, 1983: CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION
AND TRAINING INSTRUCTION 4100. 3A, Chief of Naval Education
and Training. The purpose of CNET Instruction 4100. 3A is
to provide policy, objectives and goals, and assign
responsibility for the management of energy for aircraft,
vehicles, and shore installations within the NAVEDTRACOM.
CNET Instruction 4100. 3A is based on the general guidance
of OPNAVINST 4100. 5B and is used as a benchmark on energy
reduction goals envisioned in 1983. The energy
conservation goal for shore facilities is set at reducing
energy consumption per gross square foot by 2 percent by
FY 1985, 25 percent by FY 1990, 30 percent by FY 1995, and
35 percent by FY 2000. This instruction establishes
aggressive energy reduction goals, provides guidelines for
energy conservation measures, and provides guidance on how
to evaluate energy conservation investment programs.
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Department of the Navy, 1985: Factors that Influence
the Implementation of Energy-Saving Technologies at Naval
Shore Facilities . Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port
Hueneme, CA. The purpose of this report is to assist the
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) by identifying
important factors that influence the adoption and
continued use of energy-conserving technologies at Naval
shore facilities. The report finds that an "inability to
identify energy users and to verify energy savings
inhibits effective modifications of behavioral patterns
and the introduction of new equipment. Money for
installing meters is severely limited, and personnel to
read meters is inadequate".
Department of the Navy, 1974: FAMILY HOUSING ENERGY
CONSERVATION HANDBOOK, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command. This publication discusses the role of the
Commanding Officer, Public Works Officer, and housing
occupant in the promotion of conservation of energy at
Navy activities with family housing management
responsibilities. It has been prepared to provide those
involved with methods for conserving energy and for
promoting effective communications with activity personnel
to obtain their cooperation.
Department of the Navy, 1988: NAVFACINST 4100. 8A,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria, VA. The
purpose of NAVFACINST 4100. 8A is "to establish Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) policy and
goals and assign responsibility for the management of
energy resources at NAVFACENGCOM shore installations".
This instruction mirrors the shore establishment energy
reduction goals set forth in OPNAVINST 4100. 5C. This
instruction tasks NAVFACENGCOM to optimize energy cost
through cost-effective metering, control and management of
facility energy systems to curb waste. The instruction
further stipulates that, "No restrictions shall be levied
on Navy family housing which would reduce quality of life
below that normally available to families in the civilian
community"
.
Department of the Navy, 1986: OPNAVINST 4100. 5C, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. The
purpose of OPNAVINST 4100. 5C is "to revise policy,
objectives, goals, and assign responsibilities for the
management of energy for non-nuclear ships, aircraft,
vehicles, and shore installations. This is a major
revision to OPNAVINST 4100. 5B". This instruction sets the
goal for buildings to reduce adjusted energy consumption
per thousand gross square feet by 6 percent by end FY
1990, 12 percent by end FY 1995, and 15 percent by end FY
110
2000. This instruction relaxes previous energy reduction
goals which were not attainable and establishes new goals.
Department of Defense, 1980: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
FAMILY HOUSING METERING TEST VOLUME I, Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Housing) . This voluminous document is the family housing
metering test feasibility report required by Congress in
Public Law 95-82 (1977) . The report describes the
metering test conducted on 10,379 housing units DoD wide,
estimates the cost of implementing P.L. 95-82, analyzes
potential impacts of the directed metering program and
outlines several alternatives to metering all housing
units.
Feher, Bela and Little, David and Somer, E.P. 1981:
Energy Conservation in Navy Family Housing: A "Master-
Metered" Approach , Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, San Diego, CA. The purpose of the study was to
develop, implement, and evaluate an intensive behavioral
approach for inducing energy conservation in master-
metered Navy family housing. A 200-unit housing complex
was divided into equal-sized groups and treatment was
randomly assigned to one group. Participants received
energy-related materials and feedback regarding group
energy consumption. An energy coordinator made household
visits to participating residences. The participating
group significantly reduced their electricity consumption
to a level 4 percent below that of the control group.
Consumption feedback and personal contact are seen as
important supplements to traditional educational
approaches to inducing behavioral change.
Gross, Gordon, Harper, Richard and Ahlstrom, Steve. 1975:
Energy Conservation Implications of Master Metering Volume
I. Midwest Research Institute. A study of master
metering of electrical service in apartment and office
buildings is reported here. The objectives of the study
were to determine (1) the difference between electrical
energy consumption by tenants with master metered electric
service and those who must pay individual electric bills;
(2) the extent and trends of the use of master metering of
electrical service in apartment and office buildings; (3)
the economic and other factors which influence the initial
selection or later conversion to master or individual
metering; and (4) to provide and evaluate policy
alternatives which control the practice of master
metering.
Ill
Little, David and McCabe, Kevin and Mills, Shelley and
Feher, Bela and Somer, E.P. 1981: Energy-Related
Attitudes of Navy Family Housing Residents
. Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA. The
purpose of the study was to assess the energy-related
attitudes, opinions, and practices of Navy family housing
residents. Residents of five family housing installations
located throughout the United States were surveyed.
Emphasis was directed toward the evaluation of energy-
related attitudes, housing problems, variables affecting
conservation, and energy consumption practices.
Residents' attitudes were generally of a proconservation
nature, although substantial discrepancies were evident.
Residents saw conservation information as most promotive
of conservation; and the lack of information about energy
costs and consumption and the structural soundness of the
housing, as the greatest hindrances to conservation. Most
residents reported they performed both one-time and
recurring conservation-oriented practices. However,
considerable room remains for increasing performance rates
of both kinds of practices. Recommendations included
implementing an educational program aimed at forming
proconservation attitudes and conveying information about
energy-efficient practices, utility consumption and costs.
Structural maintenance and modifications should be
integrated with educational efforts.
Magat, W. , Payne, J., Brucato Jr., P., 1986: HOW
IMPORTANT IS INFORMATION FORMAT? AN EXPERIMANTAL STUDY OF
HOME ENERGY AUDIT PROGRAMS, Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management , Vol. 6, No. 1. Among alternative regulatory
responses, information provision programs are receiving
increasing attention despite the decidedly mixed evidence
about their effectiveness. This paper provides detailed
experimental evidence to demonstrate that for one
important example of an information program, the use of
energy audits to stimulate residential energy
conservation, the effectiveness of the program is highly
sensitive to the information processing behavior of the
users of the information. Simple changes in the format of
the information provided to homeowners produced marked
improvements in the efficiency of consumer choices. The
study illustrates Stern's conclusion in a recent issue of
this journal that laboratory experimentation provides a
useful alternative to model-based analysis of natural
experiments, especially for policy design issues involving
information acquisition and processing. The paper also
offers conclusions about improving the effectiveness of
home energy audits, as well as the entire class of
information provision programs.
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McClelland, Lou., 1980: Encouraging Energy Conservation in
Multifamily Housing: RUBS and Other Methods of Allocating
Energy Costs to Residents . Institute of Behavioral
Science. This report was written to inform policy makers,
state regulatory agencies, utility companies, apartment
owners, apartment managers, and apartment residents about
methods of encouraging energy conservation in multifamily
housing by allocating energy costs to residents. Its
special focus is on methods appropriate for use in master
metered buildings without equipment to monitor energy
consumption in individual apartments. However, the report
also discusses several devices available for monitoring
individual energy consumption, plus methods of comparing
the energy savings and cost effectiveness of monitoring
devices with those of other means of promoting
conservation.
Nelson, S. H. , 1981: Energy Savings Attributable to
Switching from Master Metering to Individual Metering of
Electricity , Argonne National Laboratory. The data in
this study indicates there are significant differences in
electricity savings and suggest that these result from the
way electricity is used. Based on a format from an
earlier literature review, this study shows that savings
are smaller when electricity is also used for heating than
when it is used only for lights and appliances or only for
lights, appliances, and cooling. Based on the average of
these best guesses, the average electricity savings are
about 20 percent. However, as discussed in the study, a
significant portion of the differences in savings is due
to differences in electricity price.
Public Law 95-82, 1977: On 1 August 1977, Congress authorized
the installation of energy consumption metering devices on
military housing facilities. The Secretary of Defense was
directed to establish a ceiling for energy consumption
(norm) and then charge housing occupants for energy
consumed in excess of the established ceiling. Before
charging any housing occupant the Secretary of Defense was
directed to conduct a test program to determine the
feasibility of charging occupants for excess energy
consumption.
Ritschard, R. and Dickey, D. , 1984: ENERGY CONSERVATION IN
PUBLIC HOUSING: IT CAN WORK, Energy Systems and Policy ,
Vol. 8, No. 3. A large and growing portion of
expenditures for public housing consists of energy
expenses, which have risen primarily as a result of
increasing prices. Studies have concluded that
significant cost and energy savings may be made through
the improvement of the physical condition of the public
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housing stock. Our research shows that weatherization and
retrofit programs have been established by some local
public housing authorities and that results have been
encouraging. Widespread adoption of such programs is
hampered by difficulties in obtaining relevant technical
data.
Seligman, C. and Darley, J., 1977: FEEDBACK AS A MEANS
OF DECREASING RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, Journal of
Applied Psychology . The present study tested the
hypothesis that providing immediate feedback to homeowners
concerning their daily rate of electricity usage would be
effective in reducing electricity consumption. In the 29
physically identical three-bedroom homes used in the
study, central air conditioning is the largest single
source of electricity usage during the summer.
Accordingly, it was possible to predict the household's
expected electric consumption in terms of the average
daily outdoor temperature. Feedback was expressed as a
percentage of actual consumption over predicted
consumption, and it was displayed to the homeowners four
times a week for approximately 1 month. The results
confirmed the hypothesis. Before feedback began, the
feedback and control groups were consuming electricity at
approximately equal rates. During the feedback period,
the feedback group used 10.5% less electricity. The
effectiveness of the feedback procedure is discussed in
terms of its cuing, motivational, and commitment
functions.
Slavin, R. and Wodarski J., 1981: A GROUP CONTINGENCY
FOR ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION IN MASTER-METERED APARTMENTS,
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis , Vol. 4, No. 3. Two
studies evaluated the effects of a group contingency on
electricity conservation. In Study 1, residents of 166
apartment units in three towers held meetings and received
biweekly payments of the value of electricity saved
compared to predicted use. The group contingencies were
initiated in each tower in a multiple-baseline design.
The program produced substantial savings in one tower
(11.2% of temperature-adjusted baseline) , moderate savings
in another (4.0%), and minimal savings in a third (1.7%).
Overall, the residents saved 6.2%. In Study 2, residents
of 255 apartment units, also in three towers, received the
same treatment, except only 50% of the value of their
savings were paid, and they received a one-time bonus of
$5 for using >= 10% less than baseline. Towers in Study
2 showed savings of 9.5%, 4.7%, and 8.3%, an average of
6.9%.
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Walker, J., 1979: ENERGY DEMAND BEHAVIOR IN A MASTER-
METERED APARTMENT COMPLEX, Journal of Applied Psychology ,
Vol. 64, No. 2. In a master-metered apartment complex,
electricity use is metered at a single point for all
tenants so that tenants do not pay energy bills based on
their individual use. This article reports the results of
an experiment with such a complex. The experiment
demonstrates the successful development of an alternative
method for making tenants liable for their own energy use.
The experiment was conducted in a 176-unit master-metered
apartment complex with a resident population of
approximately 325. A similar complex served as a control.
Tenants, whose apartments were checked at random, were
paid cash awards for meeting a specified energy
conservation checklist. A comparison of samples, designed
to monitor electricity consumption behavior during
preexperimental and experimental periods, showed
statistically significant changes in behavior between the
two periods. Comparing electricity use in the
experimental complex with electricity use in the control
supported a hypothesis of significant reductions in
electricity use by the experimental complex.
Walton, Dennis L. , 1977: Costs and Benefits of
Extensive Electricity Metering at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Monterey . M.S. Thesis (Tibbitts, Advisor), Dept.
of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA. Lt Walton's thesis provides a brief history
of utilities conservation and a background on electricity
metering in the Navy. A cost analysis is made of the
savings that would be required to justify installation of
meters in the operational area of the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, using net present value
techniques. Cost data from a metering project at Pacific
Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, California forms a basis
for this analysis. The analysis indicates that meters
would be justified at the school if an annual savings of
electricity resulting from metering could be realized in
the range of 2.1% to 7.4%. Lt Walton's thesis concludes
that similar analyses should be conducted at other Navy
installations to determine the amount of electricity
savings that would be required to justify metering.
Weimer, D. and Vining, A. Policy Analysis:
Concepts and Practice . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall
1992. Within a useful and expansive framework for
implementing policy analysis, this text introduces
students to the practices of public policy while providing
a strong conceptual foundation. This Second Edition gives
practical advice about how to conduct policy analysis, and
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it demonstrates the application of advanced analytical
techniques.
Winett, R. , Kagel, J., Battalio, R. , and Winkler, R.
,
1978: EFFECTS OF MONETARY REBATES, FEEDBACK, AND
INFORMATION ON RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION,
Journal of Applied Psychology . 1978. In this study,
conducted during the summer months in Texas, 129 volunteer
participant households were assigned to one of five
experimental conditions: a high monetary rebate condition
in which participants received conservation information,
weekly written feedback on their electricity use, and
monetary rebates amounting to a 240% price change in
electricity; a low monetary rebate condition with the same
structure as the high rebates except payments amounted to
a 50% price change; a weekly feedback condition in which
participants also received information but no rebates; an
information condition; and a control condition. The
dependent measure was percentage reduction in electricity
use base on actual weekly meter readings by the research
staff. Only the high rebate condition significantly
curtailed electricity use by about 12% over the course of
the study. Elasticity estimates suggested limited
responsiveness in electricity consumption to price
changes. Questionnaire data showed a pattern in which
actual reduction in electricity was associated with
planning a conservation program, attending to feedback,
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